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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN EXPERIMENTAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS
By
Sarah Andrea Jacobson
May, 2010
Committee Chair:

Dr. Ragan Petrie

Major Department:

Economics

The chapters of this dissertation explore complementary areas of applied
microeconomics, within the fields of experimental and environmental economics. In
each case, preferences and institutions interact in ways that enhance or subvert efficiency.
The first chapter, ―The Girl Scout Cookie Phenomenon,‖ uses a laboratory
experiment to study favor trading in a public goods setting. The ability to practice
targeted reciprocity increases contributions by 14%, which corresponds directly to
increased efficiency. Subjects discriminate by rewarding group members who have been
generous and withholding rewards from ungenerous group members. At least some
reciprocal behavior is rooted in other-regarding preferences. When someone is outside
the ―circle of reciprocity,‖ he gives less to the public good than in other settings. We find
no evidence of indirect reciprocity. We find two behavioral types in each treatment,
differing in baseline giving but not in tendency to reciprocate.
The second chapter, ―The Effects of Conservation Reserve Program Participation
on Later Land Use,‖ studies another public goods issue: conservation. The Conservation
Reserve Program (CRP) pays farmers to retire farmland. We use a treatment effect
framework to find that ex-CRP land is 21-28% more likely to be farmed than comparable

x

non-CRP land. This implies that the CRP improves low-quality land, making it more
attractive to farm. This could demonstrate inefficiency, since farmers gain private benefit
from a program meant to provide a public good. On the other hand, farmed ex-CRP land
is more likely to adopt conservation practices, although this may not be caused by CRP
participation.
The third chapter, ―Learning from Mistakes,‖ examines financial decisions by
adult Rwandans in institutions inside and outside the lab. Over 50% of subjects make
irrational choices over risk—choices that likely do not reflect their preferences, and are
therefore likely inefficient—and these subjects share tendencies in their take-up of
financial instruments. Risk-averse individuals are more likely to belong to a savings
group and less likely to take out an informal loan. For those who make mistakes,
however, as they become more risk averse, they are less likely to belong to a savings
group and more likely to take up informal credit.

xi
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Chapter I: The Girl Scout Cookie Phenomenon
Peer Pressure in Grassroots Fundraising

Introduction
People seem to have a natural tendency to engage in reciprocal behavior. Their
motives, however, are often ambiguous: the same actions can be explained by otherregarding preferences or by strategic motives. The distinction is important, because in
many settings selfish motives alone cannot sustain cooperative behavior. The existence
of other-regarding preferences has been documented in isolated laboratory experiments,
but self-interest may dominate in richer field settings. Can institutions leverage otherregarding preferences while still harnessing the strategic motives of selfish people to
promote pro-social behavior? One institution that may serve this purpose is grassroots
fundraising. We report the results from a laboratory experiment that mimics elements of
this institution to study the power of favor trading to support a public good. The design
of our treatments ―subtracts away‖ the possibility of each of a number of behavioral
motives so that we can cleanly isolate the effects of direct and indirect reciprocity. We
find evidence of direct reciprocity (rooted in other-regarding preferences), but a notable
lack of indirect reciprocity.
Our methods and results are best understood through analogy to grassroots
fundraising. Many nonprofit organizations fundraise by enlisting citizen boosters to
solicit donations from their social networks. Such a fundraiser makes direct, personal
solicitations to people with whom he has an ongoing relationship. Donations are revealed
to the fundraiser and often to everyone else who is solicited. A classic example is the
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Girl Scouts of the USA, an organization that works with American girls. The Girl
Scouts’ most prominent fundraiser is the annual drive in which member girls and their
families sell cookies to friends, family, and neighbors. Klein (1990) argues that social
favor trading played a role in the funding of turnpikes in early America. The same
dynamic may occur when it is not money but time and effort being solicited, as may
happen in a volunteer advisory board or a school’s parent-teacher association.
This fundraising technique is so common that social networks are sometimes full
of people with ―pet causes‖ for which they are fundraising. Imagine that Joe and Frank
work in an office together. Joe’s son is in Boy Scouts, and Frank’s daughter is in Girl
Scouts. Each child’s organization has an annual fundraiser: Joe’s Boy Scout sells
popcorn in January, and Frank’s Girl Scout sells cookies in February. Each has a special
interest in his child’s fundraiser, because of the family’s stake in the organization’s
success. As a result, Joe will buy popcorn and Frank will buy cookies, but in addition,
Joe wants Frank to buy popcorn, and Frank wants Joe to buy cookies. Even if Frank is
not interested in the Boy Scouts (or the popcorn), Frank may buy Joe’s popcorn in
January, hoping that Joe will reciprocate when Frank’s cookie fundraiser comes around
the next month. These peers use the promise of future reciprocation—in a favor trading
exchange like many that arise in social situations—to pressure each other to perform the
pro-social act of giving to charity.
We study whether and to what extent favor trading can increase pro-social
behavior, and we look at the motives behind this behavior. Our research questions are as
follows. Does the opportunity to practice targeted reciprocity increase contributions to a
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public good? Is giving in this setting driven by direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, or
only strategic self-interest? Is there important heterogeneity in behavior?
These questions, and the efficacy of the favor trading public goods institution in
general, are difficult to study in non-experimental settings because selective use of
fundraising techniques can cause endogeneity problems in the analysis. For example,
Long (1976) found that the more ―personal‖ a donor solicitation, the more contributions
were solicited, and inferred that the reason was that a more personal solicitation allowed
the fundraiser to exert peer pressure on the donor. However, this analysis is biased in
favor of finding a relationship: personal solicitations are more costly to perform, so
charities may limit their most personal solicitations to a ―hot list‖ of likely donors.
This study fits into the literature examining social influences on cooperative
behavior. We focus on the roles of immediate self-interest, altruism, strategic selfinterest, direct reciprocity, and indirect reciprocity. Conditional cooperation, a general
form of reciprocal behavior, may influence giving in public goods games as surveyed in
Gächter (2007); this will be a background force in all of our treatments. While
immediate self-interest and altruism are well-known concepts, the other motives require
explanation. See Sobel (2005) for a review of the literature on interdependent
preferences and reciprocity, including a helpful comparison of the terminology from
various models. We use the phrase ―strategic self-interest‖ to describe Sobel’s
―instrumental reciprocity,‖ in which apparently reciprocal actions are undertaken to win
future rewards (i.e. purely for selfish reasons). One characteristic of strategic self-interest
is that, since strategic motivations depend on future rewards, the removal of those future
rewards will destroy strategically-motivated cooperation. As a result, if actors are
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strategically-motivated, finitely-repeated games that depend on cooperation tend to
unravel from the end period. Strategic cooperation could look like unconditional
cooperation, but it could also be conditional: a wise strategic person should ―bribe‖ only
people who have shown a tendency to reciprocate.
In contrast to strategic cooperation, we use the terms ―direct reciprocity‖ and
―indirect reciprocity‖ to describe conditional urges rooted in other-regarding preferences
(Sobel’s ―intrinsic reciprocity‖). Important models of this kind of reciprocity include
Rabin (1993) and Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj (2008). Most models of this type allow
Joe’s preferences over Frank’s payoffs to depend on Frank’s past actions. Because these
kinds of reciprocity are rooted in other-regarding preferences, they can sustain
cooperation even in cases where strategic cooperation would unravel. Biologists (e.g.,
Trivers 1971) have recognized the potential for reciprocity in general to promote prosocial behavior and to help pass on positive traits.
In the case of direct reciprocity, the reciprocator responds to acts that directly
affected him. For example, if Joe is a direct reciprocator, he may reward Frank for
Frank’s past behavior toward Joe. Direct reciprocity is difficult to distinguish from
strategic cooperation except that it implies continued reciprocation during end periods.
Other researchers have examined direct reciprocity using one-shot games, often with
some form of an investment game (e.g., Cox 2004). In our setting, we find direct
reciprocity in the final periods of a repeated game.
Indirect reciprocity occurs when a disinterested third party rewards good
behavior. For example, imagine that coworker Rita has no interest in Girl or Boy Scouts
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and has no pet cause of her own. If Rita rewards Frank for patronizing Joe’s charity,
she’s exhibiting indirect reciprocity. Some (e.g., Nowak and Sigmund 2005) argue that
indirect reciprocity could be a powerful tool for boosting cooperation in a large, diffuse
group.
We test for indirect reciprocity by exogenously assigning one subject to a position
from which he can differentially reward others but he himself can never be rewarded. In
this way, he benefits very little from establishing a norm of cooperation in his group.
This is a strict test of indirect reciprocity. Other studies (for example, Engelmann and
Fischbacher 2009; Seinen and Schram 2006) have found indirect reciprocity by having
subjects play one-shot cooperation games in pairs, randomly re-matching them, and
reporting to each subject’s new partner a statistic (e.g., an ―image score‖) that reflects this
subject’s past generosity. This definition of indirect reciprocity is less strict than our
definition, in that it allows indirect reciprocators to benefit from a norm of cooperation in
the group.
While laboratory experiments provide clean, controlled tests, critics have argued
that other-regarding preferences inferred from such tests are artifacts of laboratory
methods and have no relevance for behavior outside the lab. Dictator games and
investment games, often used to study altruism and reciprocity, have received particular
criticism. Some of this criticism focuses on the results of field experiments that imply
that strategic (reputation) concerns are more important than other-regarding preferences.
For example, List (2006) found that ―gift exchange‖ behavior by sports card traders is
only seen when there is an incentive to maintain a reputation, and Soetevent (2005) found
that open church collection baskets (allowing churchgoers to see each others’ donations)
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increase donations. As discussed in Falk and Heckman (2009), incentivized behavior
observed in the lab is just as ―real‖ as behavior observed in field settings, and contextspecificity is just as much of a problem for field results as it is for lab results. We take
the view that apparent conflicts between lab and field findings simply show that social
forces must be studied in a variety of controlled settings to learn in what ways they are
sensitive to institutional features.
We contribute to the literature in a number of ways. First, our ―Stakeholder‖
public goods game integrates a vehicle for targeted reciprocity into the public goods
setting, to emulate the favor trading that occurs in social networks.1 The design allows us
to isolate reciprocal behavior and test for other-regarding preferences. Second, we
include a ―Bachelor‖ design as a clean test for indirect reciprocity. Third, using a withinsubject design, we observe shifts in behavior across institutions and use an endogenous
type classification method to study heterogeneity and sensitivity to institutions.
We find that average contributions increase by 14% when targeted reciprocal acts
are possible. We confirm that reciprocal behavior is the cause for this increase, and that
this is rooted (at least in part) in other-regarding preferences. Using our strict, clean test,
we do not find evidence of indirect reciprocity. We find meaningful heterogeneity in
giving behavior, and we find some stability in behavior across treatments.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the three experimental
treatments. In the following section, we present results. In the final section, we conclude.

1

The citizen booster as public good stakeholder is one lens through which to view asymmetric returns in a
public goods game; others (e.g., Brandts, Cooper, and Fatas 2007) have examined the role of such a person
as a potential leader.
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Experimental Design
The experiment is a linear public goods game, with publicly revealed
contributions and asymmetric payoffs. Subjects are assigned to five-person groups for a
number of rounds. In each round, each person has an endowment of z tokens to allocate
between a private investment with return a to himself and a public investment with some
return to all group members. In each round, one group member is the Stakeholder: he has
a bigger stake in the public good, in that he gets a higher return (relative to other
members) from tokens invested there. The Stakeholder position rotates through group
members. The public good return is b for non-Stakeholders and c for Stakeholders.
Person i’s contribution to the public good in round t is git, and Staket is the index of the
person who is Stakeholder in round t. Payoffs are:

c j g jt  a  z  git  if Staket  i 


b j g jt  a  z  git  if Staket  i 




 it  

The parameters are such that b < a < c and a < 4b + c, so the social optimum is
achieved if everyone contributes fully. Since (c – a) is positive, the Stakeholder
maximizes profit by contributing as much as possible, so even a selfish Stakeholder
always contributes to the public good. Since (b – a) is negative, non-Stakeholders face a
dilemma: they maximize profit by keeping all of their tokens, but this free riding is antisocial. Non-Stakeholder contributions will be the focus of our analysis.
We use ui(m, y1, y2, y3, y4) to represent utility for subject i in any given round from
his earnings in this round m and the earnings of the other four members of his group y1,
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y2, y3, y4 in this round. Designate the current Stakeholder as person k (and since nonStakeholder contributions are of greatest interest, k≠i).
We borrow a nonparametric model of reciprocity from Cox, Friedman, and
Sadiraj (2008) to describe reciprocal preferences. Specifically, we note that i's marginal
rate of substitution between his own payoff and that of another subject yj may depend on
j’s past generosity toward i. If subject j was generous in the past, then i may have a lower
marginal rate of substitution (a higher willingness to pay) and thus be willing to sacrifice
his own payoff to increase j’s. That is, as a non-Stakeholder he may sacrifice high
earnings from the private investment so that he can (through a public good contribution)
increase the earnings of a subject j who has previously increased i's earnings.
In any given round, a non-Stakeholder’s (i's) contributions increase the payoff of
the other three non-Stakeholders (j≠i,k) and also the Stakeholder (k). Thus i's public good
contributions may be intended to increase the payoffs of any subject (y1, y2, y3, y4).
However, for each token contributed, the Stakeholder benefits by c and the nonStakeholders only benefit by b (recall b < a < c). Similarly, his contributions may be a
reaction to past contributions to the public good from any round. However, his earnings
are increased most by contributions made when he was Stakeholder. Therefore, he is
most likely to respond to generosity that occurred when he was Stakeholder.
A selfish person places no weight on others’ payoffs y1, y2, y3, y4, regardless of the
other subjects’ previous generosity. An unconditional altruist has a constant willingness
to pay to increase others’ payoffs, and has the same willingness to pay for all four group
members. A reciprocator has a willingness to pay for each other subjects’ payoffs that
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depends on that other subject’s past generosity. (A person who is ―practically selfish‖ for
the purposes of this experiment is one whose willingness to pay to increase others’
payoffs never increases above the opportunity cost of a public good contribution. A
―practically selfish‖ person may be a mild altruist, a mild reciprocator, or a reciprocator
who encounters only low contributors.)
Beliefs are important in determining the actions of strategic actors. If a subject is
selfish and believes that everyone else is either selfish or an unconditional altruist, he will
not contribute. If he is selfish but strategic, however, he may believe that he can
influence his group members to have a greater willingness to pay for his benefit. That is,
if he believes his group members are reciprocators, he may believe he can win future
earnings (particularly in rounds when he will be Stakeholder) by contributing to the
public good this period. Note that this future potential benefit becomes quite small once
a subject has no future Stakeholder stints. Thus, a strategic but selfish person may
cooperate in early rounds but cease to do so after he passes his last Stakeholder stint. His
early-round cooperation may target people he expects to be reciprocators (no benefit can
be gained from sacrificing for an unconditional altruist or a selfish person), and he may
learn these types by observing other subjects’ past behavior. As a result, this early-round
strategic cooperation may depend on history in much the same way that reciprocal
altruism may.2
We report three treatments: Private, Public, and Ineligible, all described in detail
below. All three use endowment z = 20 tokens, private good return a = $0.02, non2

History could also affect current behavior through contagion: a person treated well (badly) in the past
could react by behaving well (badly) not because they wish to reciprocate but because they have ―caught‖ a
good (bad) mood from their experience. This is outside of our model.
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Stakeholder public good return b = $0.01, and Stakeholder public good return c = $0.03.
For non-Stakeholders, the ―price of giving‖ is 2, while for Stakeholders it is 2/3. All
subjects participated in all three treatments, in a different group for each treatment, with
treatment order varied across sessions.
The experiment is computerized and proceeds as follows. Subjects enter the lab
and are given general instructions. (All instructions are in Appendix A.) They are told
that they will play three sets of rounds with three different groups. The first treatment
begins, with a set of specific instructions that explain the information conditions and the
number of rounds for this treatment. The subjects play through all of the rounds for that
treatment. When the first treatment is over, the groups are reshuffled. The second and
third treatments proceed in much the same way, each with treatment-specific instructions.
After all three treatments are complete, a questionnaire is administered and the subjects
are paid anonymously. Subjects’ total earnings are the sum of their earnings in each
treatment, which in turn are the sum of earnings in each round.
In the software for all three treatments, subjects see first a decision screen and
then a review screen for each round. In both the decision and review screens, the central
feature is the contribution table. This table contains a row for each round in the
treatment. Columns contain information on the subject’s contribution and the
contributions of others in his group, the group’s total contributions, and the subject’s own
earnings. Information is filled into this table after the decision stage of each round, and
remains visible for the rest of the treatment.
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The Public treatment, which lasts ten rounds, follows the basic favor-trading
public goods design outlined above. The Stakeholder position rotates through all five
group members so everyone is Stakeholder twice. Contributions are publicly revealed
and tracked individually, and Stakeholder assignments are common knowledge. Figure 1
shows the decision screen of the Public treatment. Each group member is randomly
assigned a letter code (A, B, C, D, or E) and keeps the same letter code for all ten rounds.
The contribution table shows in which rounds each subject will be the Stakeholder. Since
contribution history is public and everyone knows when each group member will be
Stakeholder, subjects can reward each other for past generosity. For example, if Joe is
subject A and Frank is subject B, Joe can see how much Frank contributed in Round 1
when Joe was the Stakeholder (when he raised funds for the Boy Scouts). Joe can reward
Frank with a large contribution when Frank is Stakeholder in Round 2 (when Frank
fundraises for the Girl Scouts), or Joe may withhold that reward if he deems Frank’s
donation stingy.
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Figure 1. Public Treatment Decision Screen

The Private treatment also lasts for ten rounds. The Stakeholder position still
rotates through all group members so that everyone is Stakeholder twice. However, the
information environment differs from the Public treatment. Each subject still sees the
disaggregated (individual) contributions of his group members, but subjects are not
assigned letter codes. It is no longer possible to track subjects’ reputations. Figure 2
shows the review screen of the Private treatment. In each round’s row, the contribution
table reports the contributions of all group members in a randomly-ordered list, reshuffled for each round. Further, even if a subject believes he can identify a group
member as being particularly worthy (or unworthy) of reward, he still does not know
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when that person will be Stakeholder. He only knows when he himself will be the
Stakeholder, so he can’t target reciprocal acts toward any other particular subject. The
Private treatment is a good baseline against which to compare Public treatment behavior
because, as Sell and Wilson (1991) show, reporting disaggregated instead of mean or
total contributions in a public goods game may increase contributions.

Figure 2. Private Treatment Review Screen

Finally, the Ineligible treatment is very much like the Public treatment, with
randomly-assigned letter codes (not linked to the Public treatment letter codes), public
reputations, and public Stakeholder timing. However, one subject in each five-member
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group (the ―Bachelor‖) is ineligible to be the Stakeholder. To return to our guiding
analogy, the ―Bachelor‖ is Rita, Joe and Frank’s officemate who does not have a pet
cause for which to fundraise. Because only four subjects are eligible to be Stakeholder,
the Ineligible treatment lasts eight rounds, so each eligible subject is still Stakeholder
twice. The Bachelor is randomly chosen and remains the Bachelor for the entire
treatment. The computer screens for the Ineligible treatment (Figure 3) are like those for
the Public treatment, except that the Bachelor is indicated in the screen header and in the
contribution table as the ―Ineligible‖ person. The Stakeholder position rotation skips the
Bachelor: if person D is the Bachelor, the Stakeholder is A, then B, then C, then E, etc.

Figure 3. Ineligible Treatment Review Screen
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The difference between the Public and Private treatments is that direct reciprocity,
indirect reciprocity, and strategic self-interest cannot motivate giving in the Private
treatment, because subjects don’t have the information they would need to respond to
each others’ actions. (Unconditional altruism and conditional cooperation—response to
overall group behavior—can affect giving in both treatments; actions targeted directly at
another individual are only possible in the Public treatment.) In the Public treatment, all
of these forces are in play because reputations and Stakeholder identities are public. Any
difference between the Public and Private treatments must be due to direct reciprocity,
indirect reciprocity, and/or strategic giving.
Within the Public treatment, we will be able to see whether subjects are
responsive to past generosity: that is, whether they discriminate by giving larger
contributions when the current Stakeholder is someone who was previously generous. In
any given round, subjects may respond to the past behavior of both the current
Stakeholder and the current non-Stakeholders. However, if we detect this kind of
responsiveness with regard to the current Stakeholder’s past actions, this is sufficient
demonstrate reciprocal giving. We can identify direct reciprocity as responsiveness of
this type that does not disappear as the end period approaches.
The Ineligible treatment allows us to investigate two additional questions. First,
the Bachelor herself (Rita, in our analogy) is not subject to direct reciprocity or strategic
self-interest. If the Bachelor does give in a way that responds to the Stakeholder’s past
generosity, this would be evidence of indirect reciprocity. Second, the presence of a
Bachelor shrinks the ―neighborhood of reciprocity‖ from five people to four people. This
leaves the Bachelor to reap benefits from other subjects’ increased generosity even if she
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herself does not contribute. We can observe whether this change in the group dynamic
affects non-Bachelor contributions. For example, others may be discouraged by
supporting a Bachelor who freeloads off the public good.
The experiments were run in the Experimental Economics Center (ExCEN) at
Georgia State University in six separate 20-subject sessions, for a total of 120 subjects.
The software was written in z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). The protocol was double
anonymous (subject decisions were anonymous even from the perspective of the
experimenter). Of the 120 subjects, 75 (62.5%) were female and the average age was
21.8. The experiment lasted about 90 minutes, and subjects earned on average $24.33
(standard deviation $2.67).

Results
As described above, each subject participated in all three treatments. The three
treatments were run in all six possible orders. We do not observe order effects, so we
pool the data across sessions. Contribution data are shown in Figure 4. Stakeholder
contributions (the dashed lines) are close to the endowment, which is expected because
the Stakeholder’s return from the public good is greater than his return from the private
good.3 Non-Stakeholder contributions (the solid lines) for each treatment are lower but
significantly positive in all rounds. These contributions show the downward trend
usually seen in public goods games. Bachelor contributions in the Ineligible treatment do
not show this trend, but they are well below contributions in the other treatments.
3

We can reject the hypothesis that contributions are strictly 100% (t-test p-value 0.000 for the Public,
0.002 for the Private, and 0.000 for the Ineligible treatment). This could be explained by subject error,
since error can only be made in the negative direction, or myopic inequity aversion.
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Figure 4. Contributions by Treatment and Role across Rounds (in Percent of Endowment)

Non-Stakeholder contributions in the Private treatment are comparable to
contributions in other linear public goods games in the literature with similar (symmetric)
―prices of giving.‖ This was not a foregone conclusion, because the presence of a
Stakeholder changes the non-Stakeholders’ incentives as compared to the incentives in a
symmetric public goods game. The Private treatment non-Stakeholder contributions start
at 41% in round 1 and end at 21% in round 10, averaging 33% across all rounds. In the
final round, 47% of non-Stakeholders make positive contributions. In Castillo and Petrie
(2010), contributions decline from 41.6% to 23.6%, averaging 32.8%; Andreoni (1988)
saw an overall average of 33.2%; Croson (1996) saw an overall average of 35.7%;
relevant surveyed results in Cox and Sadiraj (2007) show positive contributions in the
final period from 27-44% of subjects. Results from asymmetric-return public goods
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games are hard to compare because of differences in the payoff structure, but subjects
with lower marginal per capita returns in somewhat similar treatments gave 20% on
average in Goeree, Holt, and Laury (2002) and 18% in Glöckner et al. (2009). Our game
has some similarities to sequential-play public goods games, and although contributions
are hard to compare because of differences in game structure, a similar sequential game
(Güth et al. 2007) finds average contributions of 47.68% of endowment.

Treatment Effects4
The difference between the Private and Public treatments is that the Public
treatment opens the door to targeted direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, and strategic
self-interest. Thus, we can answer our first research question (whether these forces can
increase the provision of a public good) simply by determining whether non-Stakeholder
contributions are higher in the Public treatment than they are in the Private treatment.
Figure 4 shows that average non-Stakeholder contributions in the Public treatment
exceed those in the Private treatment in all rounds. These differences are only statistically
significant in a few rounds, but are significant when pooled across rounds. Table 1
shows average Stakeholder and non-Stakeholder contributions for each treatment.

4

Results that follow are mostly based on non-parametric tests; for the results of some selected parametric
tests, including various regressions, see Appendix B. All results hold for these parametric specifications.
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Table 1. Average Contributions by Treatment and Role (Percent of Endowment)
Non-Stakeholder
Stakeholder
Private Treatment
33.02
96.98
(25.98)
(10.30)
N=120
N=120
Public Treatment
37.75
95.63
(25.93)
(10.36)
N=120
N=120
Ineligible Treatment, Non-Bachelors
35.96
94.95
(22.26)
(11.74)
N=96
N=96
Ineligible Treatment, Bachelors
23.39
N/A
(28.41)
N=24
Standard deviations in parentheses

As shown in Table 1, the average non-Stakeholder contribution is 14.4% larger in
the Public (37.75% of endowment) than in the Private treatment (33.02 %). This
difference is statistically significant (Wilcoxon signed-rank test p=0.051). Thus, these
social forces increase cooperation by a modest but economically significant amount.

Table 2. Average Contributions by Treatment and Bachelor Status (Percent of
Endowment)
Non-Bachelor
Bachelor
Private Treatment
33.80
29.90
(25.83)
(26.89)
N=96
N=24
Public Treatment
37.79
37.60
(24.86)
(28.41)
N=96
N=24
Ineligible Treatment, Non-Bachelors
35.96
N/A
(22.26)
N=96
Ineligible Treatment, Bachelors
N/A
23.39
(28.41)
N=24
Standard deviations in parentheses
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As shown in Table 2, Bachelors in the Ineligible treatment contribute significantly
less (23.39% of endowment) than they did in the Private (29.90%) or Public (37.60%)
treatments (Wilcoxon signed-rank test p=0.043 and p=0.020, respectively). We cannot
precisely identify the reason that Bachelors give less than they gave as Non-Stakeholders
in the Private treatment. However, we conjecture that Bachelors feel a weakened urge to
conform to the norm of contribution since they cannot be Stakeholder, or that their
reduced earnings potential causes Bachelors to be less willing to trade off their payoff to
benefit others (because of an income effect or spite). There is no difference between nonStakeholders’ behavior in the Ineligible treatment (35.96% of endowment) and their
behavior in the Private (33.80%) and Public (37.79%) treatments (Wilcoxon signed-rank
test p=0.233 and p=0.410, respectively). Thus, though the game has changed from the
perspective of non-Bachelors (shrinking the ―circle of reciprocity‖ to four people, and
adding a public good beneficiary who is outside that circle), the effect of these changes is
indeterminate and small.
Figure 5 shows the distribution of non-Stakeholder contributions, pooled across
all rounds of all sessions. All treatments show a peak at zero tokens, a possible peak at 610 tokens, a dip between 10 and 20, and a peak at 20 tokens (full endowment). While
qualitative differences appear between the treatments, many of these are not statistically
significant. However, Bachelors give zero tokens more often in the Ineligible than in the
Private (Wilcoxon signed-rank test p=0.007) and the Public (p=0.014) treatments. Also,
in the Public treatment, subjects give 20 tokens more often than in the Private (p=0.021)
and Ineligible (p=0.098 for Bachelors, p=0.041 for non-Bachelors) treatments.
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Figure 5. Distribution of Non-Stakeholder Contribution Amounts, Pooled across Rounds

Direct Reciprocity and Other-Regarding Preferences
We wish to detect reciprocity, i.e. responsiveness to the current Stakeholder’s past
behavior. To do this, we use nonparametric within-subject tests of aggregate statistics.
For each person, we want to see whether (as non-Stakeholder) he gave more to the public
good in rounds in which the current Stakeholder was previously generous to him, as
compared to rounds in which the current Stakeholder was previously ungenerous.
Stakeholder past generosity is determined by the current Stakeholder’s average
contribution to the public good in rounds wherein this subject was the Stakeholder. For
example, Joe is Stakeholder in rounds 1 and 6, and Frank is Stakeholder in rounds 2 and
7. In round 2, Joe will remember how generous Frank was in round 1: ―Stakeholder past
generosity‖ will be Frank’s contribution in round 1. In round 7, when Frank is
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Stakeholder, our measure of ―Stakeholder past generosity‖ for Joe would be the average
of Frank’s contributions in rounds 1 and 6 (when Joe was Stakeholder).
We define a ―generosity threshold‖ such that contributions greater than this
amount are considered generous. For each subject, we calculate his average contribution
when facing a Stakeholder whose ―past generosity‖ measure meets this threshold, and his
average contribution when facing a Stakeholder whose past generosity does not. We
tried many thresholds, including the ―endogenous threshold‖ of the group’s cumulative
average contribution, and results were robust. We report results from a threshold of 10
tokens (50% of endowment). To see how this works, imagine that a group contains only
Joe, Frank, and Mary. Frank gave 15 tokens every time Joe was Stakeholder, and Mary
always gave 2 tokens. Joe’s average contribution to a generous Stakeholder is his
average contribution when Frank was Stakeholder, and his average contribution to an
ungenerous Stakeholder is his average contribution when Mary was Stakeholder.
A subject displays reciprocal behavior if he gives more when facing a previouslygenerous Stakeholder than when facing a previously-ungenerous Stakeholder. Table 3
presents averages of these measures. In the Private treatment, the two statistics are not
significantly different. This is expected (and reassuring) since in that treatment subjects
can’t tell who is Stakeholder or what the current Stakeholder did in the past. In both the
Public and Ineligible treatments, subjects give significantly more—over 50% more—to
previously-generous Stakeholders than they give to previously-ungenerous Stakeholders.5
We use a difference-in-difference test to compare responsiveness (the difference between
5

Recall that subjects could respond to past actions of the current Stakeholder and the current nonStakeholders, although their contributions benefit the former three times as much as the latter. If subjects
were responding to non-Stakeholders in this way, this would attenuate our within-subject test of
responsiveness to Stakeholder history.

23

the amount given to a generous Stakeholder and the amount given to an ungenerous
Stakeholder) between treatments. Responsiveness is greater in both the Public (14.83%
of endowment) and Ineligible (17.3% of endowment) treatments than in the Private
(-1.59% of endowment) treatment (Wilcoxon signed-rank test p=0.000 and p=0.000,
respectively). This is evidence of directly reciprocal behavior. Responsiveness does not
differ between the Public and Ineligible treatments (p=0.966).

Table 3. Average Non-Stakeholder Contributions across All Rounds by Stakeholder's
Past Generosity toward Subject (in Percent of Endowment)
Ineligible
Private
Public
Treatment
Treatment
Treatment (excl. Bachelors)
Stakeholder gave ≥ 10 on average in past
27.57
41.92
41.22
rounds in which subject was Stakeholder
(26.62)
(32.06)
(29.11)
Stakeholder gave < 10 on average in past
29.16
27.09
23.92
rounds in which subject was Stakeholder
(29.59)
(27.63)
(24.08)
N
82
95
75
P-value (Wilcoxon signed-rank test)
0.773
0.000
0.000
Standard deviations in parentheses
N’s are less than 120 because some subjects did not face both a generous and an ungenerous stakeholder.
For this reason, we dropped 38 of 120 subjects in Private, 25 of 120 in Public, and 21 of 96 subjects in
Ineligible.

Do subjects discriminate because of other-regarding preferences or because they
are strategic? We can dispose of strategic concerns by looking for reciprocal giving after
a person has passed his last Stakeholder stint. For example, again assume that Joe was
Stakeholder in rounds 1 and 6, and Frank was Stakeholder in rounds 2 and 7, and assume
that no further fundraising rounds follow. If Frank was kind to Joe in rounds 1 and 6,
will Joe reciprocate in round 7? If he is purely strategic, Joe has very little to gain, so he
should not contribute and therefore not reciprocate.
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We test for reciprocal behavior rooted in other-regarding preferences by
constructing statistics of each subject’s average contribution to previously generous and
ungenerous Stakeholders in rounds after this subject’s last Stakeholder stint. These
results, shown in Table 4, imply that other-regarding preferences play a role. Subjects in
the Public treatment continue to discriminate between generous Stakeholders (to whom
they give 30% of endowment) and ungenerous Stakeholders (16.93%) even after they
have no strategic motive to do so. In the Ineligible treatment, the sample size is greatly
reduced because fewer subjects can be considered (only non-Bachelors) and the treatment
is shorter (eight rather than ten rounds). Because of this reduced power, discrimination in
the late rounds of the Ineligible treatment is not statistically significant, although the
point estimate is positive (26.60% is given to generous Stakeholders, and only 19.30% is
given to ungenerous Stakeholders).

Table 4. Average Non-Stakeholder Contributions by Stakeholder’s Past Generosity
toward Subject, after Last Stakeholder Stint (in Percent of Endowment)
Ineligible
Private
Public
Treatment
Treatment
Treatment (excl. Bachelors)
Stakeholder gave ≥ 10 on average in past
14.60
30.00
26.60
rounds in which subject was Stakeholder
(25.70)
(30.99)
(31.98)
Stakeholder gave < 10 on average in past
18.60
16.93
19.30
rounds in which subject was Stakeholder
(29.24)
(27.43)
(27.75)
N
31
41
25
P-value (Wilcoxon signed-rank test)
0.436
0.026
0.435
Standard deviations in parentheses
N’s are less than 120 because 48 subjects had to be dropped from each treatment because there were less
than two rounds remaining after their last Stakeholder stint; additionally, more subjects had to be dropped
from each treatment (41 of 120 from Private, 31 of 120 from Public, and 23 of 96 from Ineligible) if they
did not face both a generous and an ungenerous Stakeholder after their last Stakeholder stint.
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Indirect Reciprocity
An indirect reciprocator is a disinterested party who rewards one subject for
generosity toward another subject. A strict definition of indirect reciprocity cannot be
tested by looking at the responsiveness of a subject who has the opportunity to be
Stakeholder, because he is not disinterested: he can benefit from a norm of cooperation.
Our clean test for indirect reciprocity is the behavior of Bachelors in the Ineligible
treatment. These randomly-selected subjects will never be Stakeholder, so they can never
receive the benefits of targeted reciprocity. Therefore, direct reciprocity and strategic
self-interest are not strong motives for Bachelors.
We have shown that Bachelors give significantly less than non-Stakeholders in
the Ineligible treatment and less than they themselves gave in the other treatments. The
people who are Bachelors show evidence of reciprocity in the Public treatment (i.e. they
have positive ―responsiveness,‖ as defined previously; results available on request), so
they do behave reciprocally when they are part of the circle of reciprocity. However,
Bachelors in the Ineligible treatment do not give more (Wilcoxon signed-rank p=0.823)
when facing previously generous Stakeholders (when they give 21.91% of endowment on
average) than when facing previously ungenerous Stakeholders (25.54% of endowment).
Therefore, indirect reciprocity does not seem to be a motivator in this setting.
This result is particularly intriguing, given that other studies have found indirect
reciprocity. However, the re-matching structure of those experiments allows subjects to
have an interest in the group’s overall cooperation. Therefore, subjects in those
experiments are not wholly disinterested, as our Bachelors are. Both conditions are valid
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settings in which to examine cooperation; however, we feel that our result hews more
closely to the ―bystander‖ interpretation of indirect reciprocity.

Heterogeneity in the Population
In estimating population effects, we may be missing important heterogeneity in
individual behavior. Our within-subjects implementation allows us to characterize each
subject within a treatment and see how subjects change their behavior between
treatments. We use an endogenous classification method to characterize subjects by their
baseline giving and their responsiveness to other subjects’ past behavior. This method
(based on the "estimation / classification" method of El-Gamal and Grether 1995)
specifies a finite mixture model that mixes several instances of the same model and then
uses maximum likelihood to simultaneously assign subjects to types and choose the
parameters (coefficients) for each type. This allows the data to generate the ―rules‖ that
best describe the data. A standard finite mixture model generates population percentages
for each of the nested models. To summarize the data, we assign each subject to the type
that best describes his contributions; that is, for each subject, we round to 1 the
probability of the type that best represents him, and round the rest down to 0.
We index types by m, and model contributions as a function of a history variable
hikt (subject k’s past contributions when person i was Stakeholder as of period t) and other
variables Xit. The model uses type-specific parameters, including a constant parameter
am which represents baseline tendency to give (altruism), and a ―responsiveness‖
parameter bm. The empirical model for each type is:

git  am  bm hikt  Cm Xit   it

27

This analysis is similar to Bardsley and Moffatt (2007). However, their game is
different (as it is a sequential public goods game using a ―Conditional Information
Lottery‖ to determine payments). Also, while they specify four types (a free-rider type,
an altruist type, a reciprocator type, and a strategic type) and then estimate each type’s
parameters and mixing probabilities using maximum likelihood, we specify a number of
types but do not restrict parameters of any of the types (e.g., a=b=0 for an free-rider).
We performed this analysis with two, three, and four types. In the results we
report, Xit includes only the group cumulative average contribution (excluding the
subject’s own past contributions and the current Stakeholder’s past contributions).
Results were robust to the inclusion of round number and a dummy indicating whether
the subject had passed his last Stakeholder stint. Results were also robust to the inclusion
of subject demographics (gender and age), but as none were significant we do not report
those results.
For simplicity, Table 5 presents results from the two-type analysis. In each
treatment, Type 1 is large (comprising 61-73% of the population) and has a small a1 (low
altruism), whereas Type 2 has a large a2 (high altruism, a2 > a1). Thus, we will call Type
1 ―low type‖ and Type 2 ―high type.‖ The bm parameter (responsiveness) is large,
significant, and positive for both types in both the Public and Ineligible treatments.6
Within each treatment, the types show similar responsiveness (b1 ≈ b2, t-test p-value
greater than 0.13 in all cases). That is, while the types differ in altruism, all types tend to

6

As the table shows, the responsiveness coefficient is also significant (but very small) in the Private
treatment, though in this treatment it is not possible to target reciprocal behavior at individuals. This
spurious significance comes from the dynamic entanglement inherent in panel analysis of this kind of data.
Responsiveness is much higher in the Public and the Ineligible treatments as compared to the Private
treatment (t-test p-value=0.000 and 0.001, respectively).
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reciprocate. This universal responsiveness holds as more types are added. Thus, the
most important heterogeneity is in the baseline tendency to give and not in the tendency
to reciprocate.

Type 2

Type 1

Table 5. Behavioral Types from Estimation / Classification Procedure
Private
Public
Treatment
Treatment
Number (percent) in type 1
76 (63%)
73 (61%)
Number (percent) in type 2
44 (37%)
47 (39%)
Constant
8.34***
-3.91
(2.60)
(3.34)
Stakeholder past contributions to
0.09**
0.33***
me
(0.04)
(0.04)
Group cumulative non0.24***
0.37***
Stakeholder contributions
(0.06)
(0.07)
(excluding me)
Constant
38.72***
23.96***
(4.29)
(4.25)
Stakeholder past contributions to
-0.01
0.43***
me
(0.078)
(0.06)
Group cumulative non0.32***
0.28***
Stakeholder contributions
(0.10)
(0.09)
(excluding me)
# of observations
720
720
Log likelihood
-3389.976
-3411.576
AIC
6791.952
6835.152
BIC
6808.677
6851.877

Ineligible
Treatment
70 (73%)
26 (27%)
8.51**
(3.71)
0.30***
(0.05)
0.12*
(0.07)
50.07***
(8.22)
0.36***
(0.10)
-0.27*
(0.07)
432
-1612.1664
3236.3328
3251.719

Standard errors in parentheses. Normal distribution for error; mean is linear function of covariates.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

For comparison, Bardsley and Moffatt (2007) find approximately 39% of subjects
to be strategists, 25% to be free-riders, 30% to be reciprocators, and 6% to be altruists. A
striking similarity between their results and ours is that neither they nor we find
significant evidence of unconditional altruism.
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How do subjects change across treatments? There is imperfect stability in types:
56% of subjects are the same type for all treatments, and most of these (42% of the
population) are consistently low type. Subjects who are high type in one treatment give
significantly more in the other treatments.7 Type transitions are shown in Table 5. The
low type is ―stickier‖ in a loose sense: for each treatment, subjects that are low type in
that treatment are very likely (78-85%) to be low type in the other treatments, while hightype subjects are less likely (32-56%) to become low type.

Table 6. Treatment-to-Treatment Type Transitions: Percent of Subjects Making Each
Transition
Low to Low
Low to High
High to Low High to High
From Private
To Public
49%
14%
12%
25%
From Private
To Ineligible
54%
9%
19%
18%
From Public
To Ineligible
50%
9%
23%
18%
Transitions to and from Ineligible treatment types use only 96 subjects, since Bachelors are excluded.

Conclusion
Favor trading is a natural element of social networks. Grassroots fundraising
harnesses people’s tendency to trade favors and uses that reciprocal drive to increase the
provision of public goods. Using an experimental design that allows different forms of
reciprocity to be turned on and off, we explore the power of favor trading and the
mechanisms through which this institution may work.

7

Results available on request. For example, Private-high type subjects give more in the Public treatment
than do Private-low type subjects (55.61% of endowment as compared to 27.41%, Wilcoxon rank-sum test
p=0.000).
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We demonstrate reciprocal giving rooted in other-regarding preferences, i.e. direct
reciprocity. While some studies have robustly shown direct reciprocity in laboratory
institutions like the investment game, others have criticized the abstraction and isolation
of those institutions. The presence of direct reciprocity in our slightly richer setting may
be the next step in building a bridge toward non-laboratory institutions that encourage the
expression of direct reciprocity.
It is remarkable that in our strict, clean test, we do not find indirect reciprocity.
Our definition of indirect reciprocity may be too strict, in a sense. While most
experiments seeking indirect reciprocity allow actors to benefit from an increased
tendency to cooperate within the group, we strip our Bachelor of incentives to foster
cooperative norms. It is also notable that in our setting, Bachelors can never earn as
much as other subjects. It is possible that this inequity causes some feeling of
disaffection on the part of the Bachelors, and this suppresses the expression of their social
preferences. This accords with the low level of contributions by Bachelors, and also with
the remarkably flat profile of Bachelor contributions across the rounds of the treatment.
Whatever the explanation, our results imply that indirect reciprocity is sensitive to
institutional factors. The institutional factors essential to our test of indirect reciprocity—
the disinterestedness of the indirect reciprocator and the potential for inequity—are
factors that could certainly be present in many evolutionary settings, so the absence of
indirect reciprocity in our results is quite interesting.
In our experimental setting, favor trading increases cooperation by 14.4%, an
amount that is both statistically and economically significant. This should provide a
lower bound for the level of efficiency that this kind of institution might achieve. In a
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true social situation, rewards and sanctions are much stronger motivators than the
incentives offered in the lab, and social interactions can be an extremely long-term game.
These results support our intuition about the effectiveness of grassroots solicitation as a
fundraising tool, and suggest that favor trading could be successfully leveraged in other
settings as well. Our results also show the robustness of direct reciprocity, and the
fragility of indirect reciprocity, to small changes in the institution.
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Chapter II: The Effects of Conservation Reserve Program Participation on Later
Land Use

Introduction
The United States Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) pays farmers to retire
land from agriculture. The program has several goals, including the preservation of
environmental assets and the long-term improvement of the country’s agricultural
productivity. Balancing multiple goals is always difficult, and may be especially
challenging with regard to the long-term effects of such a program. In the case of the
CRP, the disposition of land that leaves the program deserves study because the program
is extremely large and market and political factors can trigger policies that suddenly
release quantities of CRP land. For example, the 2008 Farm Bill dictated a drop in the
CRP’s enrollment cap from 39.2 million acres to 32 million acres. If land that leaves the
CRP persists in conservation, this long-term effect boosts the program’s environmental
benefits. If ex-CRP land returns to farming at a high rate, however, this works against
the program’s environmental goals, but may indicate that the CRP made the land more
productive.
We examine land use of parcels that have been in the CRP to determine whether
the CRP has an effect on the land’s later use. We ask whether CRP participation causes
land to be more or less likely to be farmed (or to take up another land use) and whether
past CRP participation is correlated with the use of conservation practices on farmed
land. We focus on land that exited the CRP between 1992 and 1997, the first period in
which land left the program in great quantity. We use a treatment effect framework, with
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regression and matching methods. This approach makes an explicit comparison between
land that has been in the CRP (―treated‖ parcels) and land that has not been in the
program (―control‖ parcels), a comparison we must make to attribute causality to CRP
participation.
The CRP was established by the 1985 Food Security Act. A CRP contract binds a
landowner to abstain from farming the land for a period (10-15 years) and to plant a
conservation cover for that period. To join the program, farmers submit bids consisting
of the rental payment they will accept, the land they would like to enroll, and the
conservation cover they will plant. The ―best‖ bids (according to criteria that evolved
over time) are accepted. The USDA reimburses farmers for some of the cost of planting
conservation cover. If a farmer exits before his contract expires, he pays a penalty.
The program has been very popular. Enrollment has usually been near its acreage
cap (36.4 million to 39.2 million acres from 1992 to 2002), and competition has been
keen for CRP contracts. The first contracts expired in 1996. Very few parcels left the
program before that, and in 1996 (as in later years) most parcels with expiring contracts
re-enrolled. There is some variability in a parcel’s ability to exit or re-enroll in the
program. For example, around 1996, some holders of unexpired contracts were allowed
to remove their land from the program without penalty, and some expiring contracts were
automatically extended for one year if the contract-holder wanted to do so. The CRP’s
eligibility criteria and bidding system also changed over the years to improve incentivecompatibility and to take into account an Environmental Benefits Index (EBI). As a
result, some early enrollment waves accepted land for contracts that, when expired, were
not renewable because the land did not meet the CRP’s new criteria.
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Post-CRP land disposition has been of interest for some time, but since CRP exits
did not occur in quantity until the first contracts expired in 1996, studies before 1996
were performed using surveys and simulations. Researchers (for example, Cooper and
Osborn 1998; Johnson, Misra, and Ervin 1997) surveyed farmers to gauge their intentions
to remain in the program and their plans for the land if the CRP were eliminated. These
surveys give useful qualitative results; for example, they indicate that not all CRP land
would be farmed if it were not in CRP and that market prices drive land use decisions.
General equilibrium simulators estimate parameters or elasticities from observed
land use and then use those estimates to predict the land use transitions that would occur
under different market and policy conditions. These simulations account for the effects
of CRP entry and exit on agricultural supply and therefore on price, which can feed back
into other parcels’ entry into and exit from agriculture.8 Using the POLYSYS simulator,
De La Torre Ugarte et al. (1995) estimate that 57% of CRP land would be farmed if the
CRP was terminated, and De La Torre Ugarte and Helliwinckel (2006) estimate that 37%
of CRP land would be farmed if the CRP were gradually eliminated. Secchi and Babcock
(2007) use the EPIC simulator to show that crop prices have a very strong influence on
the decision to un-retire CRP land. Lubowski, Plantinga, and Stavins (2008) find that the
CRP accounted for a reduction in cropland of 29 million acres between 1982-1997 (given
32.8 million acres estimated enrolled in 1997, this implies that at least 88% of CRP land
would have been farmed).
While general equilibrium simulation is essential for market-level analyses, it
may not be well-suited to the analysis of parcel-level transitions, as discussed in Roberts
8

One such phenomenon is ―slippage,‖ as discussed in Wu (2000) and a series of related papers.
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and Lubowski (2007). General equilibrium simulators predict land use by assuming that
land will enter its highest return use. These models’ ability to predict in this context is
limited by the fact that returns (and land characteristics determining those returns) are not
fully observed. Therefore, micro-level analyses of land use changes are a useful
complement to general equilibrium simulations.
One such analysis is Roberts and Lubowski (2007), who also examine post-CRP
land use decisions. They use post-CRP land use in 1997 to parameterize a model of land
use for ex-CRP land, and perform a partial equilibrium simulation to predict that 58% of
CRP land would enter farming if the program were eliminated. Roberts and Lubowski
use a Heckman two-stage model to control for selective exit from the CRP. However, a
remaining concern is selection in CRP enrollment: land that enters the program must be
have low opportunity costs, i.e. low returns from farming. To assign causality to CRP
participation, this selection must be considered so that CRP parcels are compared to
parcels that are similar in quality—that is, to land that is also marginal and therefore
likely to leave farming anyway.
We compare ex-CRP parcels to parcels that have not been in the program to ask:
did CRP participation cause changes in the later land use of enrolled parcels (compared to
the use they would have entered had they not ever been in CRP)? In contrast, Roberts
and Lubowski ask: given a known function that determines post-CRP land use, what will
happen to currently-enrolled CRP land if the program disappears?
This paper contributes to the literature in a number of ways. We attribute
causality to CRP experience by using plausible counterfactual (non-CRP) land parcels.
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Our methodology is innovative in the use of a sample specification step that trims the
treatment (CRP) and control (non-CRP) groups to the most comparable units. We also
perform a multinomial logit analysis, which more thoroughly explores the land use
decision. Finally, we study adoption of conservation practices on land that exits CRP and
is later farmed.
We find that a naïve analysis, without careful specification of counterfactual land,
shows that ex-CRP land is farmed at a lower rate than other parcels. However, when
compared with the best counterfactual group, ex-CRP land is 21-28% more likely to be
farmed than non-CRP land. Because this counterfactual group is very much like the exCRP group, we can infer that the increase in cultivation is caused by CRP participation.
This result is novel in the literature, but is not unexpected, since the land should have
improved while in the program. Thus, the CRP’s long-term effects comport with some of
the program's goals (such as agricultural efficiency) while working against others
(environmental protection). We also show that cultivated ex-CRP land is more likely
than similar land to adopt a conservation practice such as contour farming. However, we
cannot infer whether the conservation practice result is caused by CRP participation.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, we discuss
a model of land use choice. Next, we describe the methods we will use to address the
research questions. In the following section, we introduce the data and provide summary
information. We give special attention to the potential ―treatment‖ (CRP) and ―control‖
(non-CRP) groups that will be used in the analysis. We present results in the following
section. In the final section we conclude.
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Theory
The essential insight behind the analysis is that a land parcel’s use is determined
by the relative returns of all possible uses for that parcel. This model has its roots in the
ideas of Ricardo and von Thünen: land enters the use that provides the highest quasirents, and these quasi-rents depend on land quality and land location. In this model, we
may abstract away from landowner preferences, because idiosyncratic values are
reflected in quasi-rents if markets are competitive and complete.
We denote land use as a  A, where A is the set of all possible land uses. We
define p as the vector of input and output prices in the economy, x as the vector of land
characteristics, and t as the vector of technology and policy factors. Each parcel has a
quasi-rent corresponding to each potential use in set A. The quasi-rents are functions of
p, x, and t: that is, landowner rents from use a are  (a | p, x, t). Observed land use is:

a*  arg max   a | p, x, t 
aA

Some important points inform the analysis. First, we must be concerned with both
observable and unobservable elements of the land characteristic vector x. Land
characteristics have static elements and elements that vary over time in ways that depend
on the land’s history. For example, soil can become more erodible as land is farmed.
Notably, soil erodibility can improve as land is removed from agriculture and conserved,
such as when it is planted with conservation cover, and CRP participation has been
shown to improve land quality (e.g., Uri 2001). Low soil quality (e.g., high erodibility)
makes the land less productive to farm, so parcel-level quasi-rents also depend on
interactions between land characteristics and market prices.
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Land use transitions should occur when the quasi-rent from the current land use is
less than the quasi-rent that could be earned from some alternative land use. However,
some parcels face transition costs when changing land use. For example, parcels in CRP
contracts face penalties if they exit the program before the contract has expired. Even on
contract expiration, land seeking to leave CRP and enter agriculture faces irreversible
transition costs and uncertain future returns; these characteristics can delay or forestall
transitions. For land leaving CRP, transition costs back into agriculture are affected by
the type of conservation cover planted for CRP. Grasses are the most common cover (the
others are forest and wildlife habitat) and carry the lowest transition cost. Because of
transition costs, changes observed over short periods (such as the transitions we
investigate) should understate the long-term transitions that will occur.
Transitions into the CRP are costly, but are subsidized by the government: the
USDA reimburses some of the costs of planting conservation cover. These transitions are
not possible for all parcels because of CRP eligibility requirements. As the CRP’s
criteria changed to emphasize environmental benefits, some parcels in the program
ceased to be eligible. In these cases, if the contract-holder re-applied upon expiration of
the contract, the application was rejected. Thus, when a parcel leaves the CRP, it could
be because the landowner prefers to put the land into another use (i.e. because the return
to another use is now higher) or because it is no longer eligible to stay in the program. 9
When a parcel leaves the CRP voluntarily or is forced out, it should transition into
the most profitable non-CRP land use. CRP contracts are only granted to land that was

9

Parcels that are potentially eligible with respect to land characteristics may be rejected if the bid was too
high. If the bidding mechanism is incentive-compatible, the bid reflects the parcel’s opportunity cost.
Such a rejected bid would mean that the return to another use (the opportunity cost) now exceeds the return
to CRP participation.
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cultivated cropland at the time of application, so farming may be the next most profitable
activity for much of this land. However, as noted above, transition costs may delay or
forestall desired transitions. Additionally, land characteristics and market conditions may
have changed to make farming either more or less profitable for any given parcel.
Many factors described above would have influenced land use decisions even
without the CRP. We seek to identify the change in land use decisions that occurs
because of parcels’ experience in the CRP. How can CRP tenure cause changes in postprogram land use? The CRP experience could change landowner preferences for
conservation to reduce the likelihood of farming. Recall, however, that the model
assumes that preferences are reflected in quasi-rents, so the model does not allow
identification of such an effect. Practically, however, these preferences could be
imperfectly capitalized or not perfectly reflected in quasi-rent proxies. On the other
hand, land improvement while in the program increases the returns to farming, and this
should increase the likelihood of farming. Land that is retired from farming but does not
enter CRP may also improve, but CRP’s subsidization of conservation practices and
CRP’s enforced 10-year retirement should cause greater improvement. Thus, theory is
ambiguous as to what effect CRP participation should have on later land use.

Methods
The fundamental problem of causal inference is that it is impossible to observe
any unit as both a treated unit and a counterfactual (non-treated) unit. Here, end-ofperiod (1997) land use is the outcome and CRP participation is the treatment. To identify
effects of CRP participation on land use, we must compare the land use outcomes of each
CRP parcel to the outcomes that would have occurred had the parcel never entered CRP.
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The fundamental problem of causal inference appears here in that we cannot know what
would have happened to these CRP parcels had they not entered the program. These
parcels are different from non-CRP parcels because of selectivity in CRP entrance, and
therefore a simple comparison to the land use outcome of non-CRP parcels could produce
biased results. We must choose non-CRP parcels that can act as good counterfactuals.
Controlling for land characteristics, the returns to various land uses, and the
interactions between these would yield unbiased results if the treatment and control
groups are sufficiently similar. For our first step, we perform a variety of ―naïve‖
analyses using a full data set. We regress end period (1997) farming outcome on past
CRP status, controlling for land characteristics, estimated returns to land uses, interaction
terms, and region dummies, with appropriate spatial error clustering.
If the parcels in the control (non-CRP) group are very unlike parcels in the
treatment (CRP) group, regression results can be biased, as demonstrated in Rosenbaum
(2002). This is because treatment units are compared to inappropriate control units, and
given the inevitable mis-specification of a linear model, differences in sample
characteristics may drive apparent differences in outcomes. To try to counteract this bias,
we perform a matching analysis on the same data set. The matching algorithm chooses
the control (non-CRP) units that are ―most like‖ the treated (CRP) units based on
observable characteristics. All matching results reported in this paper use nearest
neighbor matching, without calipers, using the Stata package psmatch2 (Leuven and
Sianesi 2003). A propensity score is estimated (as a function of land characteristics, rent
proxies, and region dummies) to determine a given parcel’s likelihood of being in CRP.
A Mahalanobis metric (a way of calculating the difference between points in a
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multidimensional space) is used to do the matching, and this metric is calculated from the
land characteristics, rent proxies, region dummies, and the propensity score. We
calculate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) based on the matched sample.
Matching can only account for differences in observable characteristics. If
treatment and control groups differ in unobservable characteristics that are correlated
with the outcome of interest, matching results may still be biased. What unobservable
characteristics are important in this analysis? Land characteristics are imperfectly
observed, and transition costs are difficult to estimate, but both are crucially important in
the determination of land use outcomes.
To address this, we perform an additional sample specification step. We trim the
samples of CRP and non-CRP data to include only the parcels that are most appropriate
to compare, based on theory and program characteristics. Conceptually, this is a
population-level process much like the observation-level process of matching: the most
comparable treatment and control group are selected based on observables to reduce bias.
Comparability of the populations is difficult to ensure because of unobservable
differences in the unobservable characteristics of land. However, inferences about these
land characteristics can be drawn from the land use into which the parcel’s owner has
chosen to put it. This sample specification step, therefore, is a selection process targeting
the CRP and non-CRP parcels that are most comparable based on the characteristics that
can be inferred from their patterns of land use. The results comparing different
subsamples used in the analysis in this paper can be thought of as ways of approaching
the data with different research questions.
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We specify two different treatment groups: CRP-Eligible and CRP-Exit. CRPEligible includes land that enrolled in the CRP in an early signup wave and was therefore
probably eligible to exit by 1997. (Publicly-available data do not identify contract end
dates, so exit eligibility is not known and must be guessed.) If the treatment group
included land outside this group, many CRP parcels would be locked into contracts that
are costly to exit, and the results would greatly understate the likelihood of transitions.
However, much of the land that was eligible to exit actually stayed in the CRP, in part
because of the automatic contract extension offered by the USDA in 1996. If a parcel
stayed in the program, CRP participation may have changed the use this land would have
adopted had it left the program, but it did not increase any of those returns enough to
drive the land out of the program, or at least not by 1996. In this sense, it is not possible
to fully observe the CRP’s effect on land use for any parcels that stayed in the program.
We therefore create the group CRP-Exit, containing only parcels that actually
exited. CRP-Exit contains some parcels that choose to leave (perhaps because they could
earn a greater return outside the program), and some that are forced out (including parcels
that do not meet new CRP eligibility rules), but it is not possible to determine why any
given parcel left the program. Given the automatic contract extensions offered in 1996, it
is likely that most CRP exits at this time were voluntary.
Using CRP-Eligible as the treatment group asks the question, ―Given that staying
in CRP is allowed, what land use is observed on land that has been in CRP?‖ Using
CRP-Exit asks, ―Given land that has exited the CRP, what land use is observed?‖ This is
a narrower question, because it is likely that the parcels that exit CRP are better-quality
than the parcels that remain in the program. Some parcels may have exited specifically
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so that they can be farmed. The results from an analysis that uses CRP-Exit are
informative, but caution should be exercising when extrapolating to other CRP parcels.
We also specify two different control (non-CRP) groups. Control-All includes all
land that was farmed in 1982, the start of our analysis period. This restriction is
important, because only farmed land can enter the CRP. Control-All includes productive
farmland that is very unlike CRP land. We can control for observable characteristics, but
these may understate the differences between CRP and Control-All parcels.
To address this difference in unobservables, we specify another non-CRP group
called Control-Unfarmed. Control-Unfarmed parcels were farmed in 1982, so share a
history of cultivation with the CRP parcels, but were not farmed in 1992. This ensures
that non-CRP parcels face transition costs if they are to be cultivated, as CRP parcels do.
It also restricts the sample to land of low enough quality that the landowner is willing to
remove it from cultivation, which must also be true of CRP land. That is, by his land use
choice, the landowner of a Control-Unfarmed parcel has revealed that his parcel’s
unobservable attributes are of low quality, just as the landowner of a CRP parcel has.
There are a few sources of possible differences between Control-Unfarmed and
CRP land. First, Control-Unfarmed land may be of lower quality than ex-CRP land
because Control-Unfarmed was willing to retire from farming without a subsidy, while
some CRP land probably would not have retired without being paid. This would make
Control-Unfarmed less likely to be farmed later. Second, and conversely, some ControlUnfarmed land may be higher quality because it left farming but did not choose to enter
CRP (we cannot identify which land applied to CRP and was rejected and which did not
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apply). These farmers may have wanted to keep the value of the option to farm during
the coming ten years. This would make Control-Unfarmed more likely to be farmed.
Because of these factors, Control-Unfarmed land may be slightly better or slightly
worse than CRP land. We acknowledge this potential difference. However, we expect
that the resulting bias should be small, and we feel that Control-Unfarmed is still the best
possible counterfactual group for CRP land.
Additionally, factors related to the timing of transitions may bias the results of
comparison between CRP land and Control-Unfarmed. First, some Control-Unfarmed
land may be in fallow cycles. The data set we use tries to classify land in a fallow cycle
as cultivated cropland. Land classified as non-cultivated cropland (which is mostly hay)
or pastureland is verified to have not been cultivated cropland for the last three years.
However, if the fallow cycle is five years or longer, this land may be misclassified so that
it ends up in the Control-Unfarmed category. Parcels that exit CRP may begin farming
immediately because they will have just emerged from a 10-year fallow period (their
CRP tenure), but only some non-CRP parcels in long fallow cycles will be ready to farm.
This may introduce a bias making Control-Unfarmed less likely to be farmed in 1997 as
compared to ex-CRP land. Second, and conversely, if transitions into farming take time
our results may be biased to show Control-Unfarmed land more likely to be farmed. This
is because, whereas non-CRP land can transition into farming in any year, CRP land can
only transition after contracts end in 1996. Thus, ex-CRP land transitions may be underrecorded relative to non-CRP land transitions, thus biasing our results toward zero.
Using the pre-processed treatment and control groups, we perform the same
regression and matching analyses described for the naïve sample. Comparing transitions
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into cultivated cropland among CRP-Exit parcels to those observed among ControlUnfarmed parcels is akin to performing a difference-in-difference analysis. It is the
difference between CRP and non-CRP land in the difference in land use between the
earlier period (1982) and the end period (1997). Analyses on the broader data set, and on
the other combinations of treatment and control groups, do not yield valid difference-indifference results because in those cases, the samples are not comparable.

Data and Summary Statistics
CRP contract information is sensitive and therefore is not distributed at a level of
detail that is useful for parcel-level analysis. We use data from a large nationwide land
survey to collect parcel-level characteristics, and we match those data with county-level
estimates of the returns to various land uses.
First, parcel-level data were obtained from the USDA’s National Resource
Inventory (NRI; see US Department of Agriculture 2001). The NRI is a panel survey of
over 800,000 land parcel samples throughout the country. It provides data for 1982,
1987, 1992, and 1997. The NRI is a stratified survey, and the analysis that follows takes
into account the NRI’s sampling structure. Data are not available for Alaska or the US
Virgin Islands, and we exclude parcels in Hawai’i and Puerto Rico, since land use
decisions in those areas are likely to be quite different from land use decisions in the
forty-eight contiguous states. Variables reflecting essential land quality data are not
recorded for land that is urban, transportation, federal, or water. As a result, we exclude
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parcels that entered one of these land uses in 1997. This exclusion is particularly
acceptable because this land’s use may be idiosyncratic.10
The NRI land quality data of interest for this analysis are slope, erodibility, land
capability classification (defined in US Department of Agriculture 2009), and the prime
farmland indicator (ibid.). The NRI records land use in broad categories (e.g., cultivated
cropland, non-cultivated cropland (which is mostly hay), pasture, and CRP) and narrower
sub-categories. Throughout this paper, cultivated cropland will be referred to as
―farmed‖ land. This use includes all close and row crops, and will be an outcome of
particular interest because of farming’s environmental impact. Parcel location
information is available but limited in precision because the NRI data are designed to
render precise sample location identification impossible.
The second source of data is a set of county-level proxies for the returns to
various land uses. These data consist of 1996 rent levels and 1986-1996 changes in rent
levels for various land use categories. These rent data are described in the appendix of
Roberts and Lubowski (2007). These county-level proxies are only available for 1600
counties, and the analysis considers only counties for which rent data are available.11
Table 7 shows the characteristics of land in subpopulations of interest. The first
column shows all land that was farmed in 1982, and the second column shows all land
that was in CRP in 1992. As expected, CRP land is worse than the broader sample of
originally-farmed land by all measures (less likely to be prime or have a good land
classification, more erodible, and more sloped). CRP land also tends to stay in CRP at a

10

Results hold for specifications excluding land classification (the characteristic available for the fewest
uses) from the control variable set and including the land from these 1997 uses (available upon request).
11
All NRI counties with CRP parcels have rent data; only non-CRP parcels are thus excluded. Summary
statistics including parcels without rent data are similar to those presented here (available upon request).
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very high rate, and farmed land tends to continue to be farmed at a high rate. Among the
specified subsamples, Control-All (the general non-CRP land sample) is of better quality
than all of the other groups are, including Control-Unfarmed (the land that left farming
but did not enter CRP). Both Control groups are of better quality than both CRP groups.
CRP-Exit is of somewhat better quality by most measures than the CRP-Eligible group,
which supports the intuition that some land leaves CRP specifically to be farmed.
Interestingly, Control-Unfarmed is very slightly better than CRP-Exit on observable
characteristics.
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Table 7. Characteristics of Land in Subsets of NRI Sample
Prime farmland? a, d
Good land class? a,
c, d

Erodibility index a,
d

Slope a, d
Return: crops b
Return:
government
payments b
Return: pasture b
Return: range b
Return: forest b
Return: urban b
Early CRP signup
wave
CRP cover of grass
in 1992
CRP in 1992
CRP in 1997
Farmed in 1992
Farmed in 1997
Conservation
practice if farmed
in 1997
Hundreds of acres

Farmed in
1982
0.547
(0.002)
0.952
(0.001)
7.330
(0.026)
2.759
(0.009)
93.365
(0.150)
10.967
(0.014)

CRP in
1992
0.286
(0.002)
0.875
(0.002)
12.990
(0.971)
4.260
(0.018)
80.739
(0.097)
8.856
(0.010)

CRP-Exit

29.050
(0.064)
10.912
(0.032)
11.725
(0.044)
2331.954
(4.968)
-

27.052
(0.024)
11.228
(0.027)
12.189
(0.011)
2426.994
(3.711)
0.617
(0.002)
0.906
(0.001)
1
(0)
0.895
(0.001)
-

30.967
(0.181)
8.937
(0.201)
21.662
(0.140)
2450.342
(31.431)
0.821
(0.005)
0.920
(0.004)
1
(0)
-

0.082
(0.000)
0.078
(0.000)
0.821
(0.001)
0.790
(0.001)
0.233
(0.001)
3,755,742

CRPEligible
0.262
(0.004)
0.873
(0.002)
13.759
(0.108)
4.270
(0.025)
81.074
(0.275)
8.870
(0.275)

ControlAll
0.576
(0.002)
0.960
(0.001)
7.176
(0.030)
2.783
(0.011)
94.863
(0.168)
11.192
(0.016)

ControlUnfarmed
0.438
(0.006)
0.895
(0.004)
10.579
(0.221)
4.166
(0.046)
98.626
(0.820)
9.023
(0.061)

29.267
(0.072)
10.872
(0.036)
11.659
(0.049)
2318.095
(5.517)
-

31.005
(0.308)
10.553
(0.145)
14.453
(0.181)
2260.462
(21.918)
-

-

-

-

-

-

28.109
(0.104)
11.179
(0.064)
12.807
(0.065)
2566.866
(8.409)
1
(0)
0.927
(0.001)
1
(0)
0.863
(0.002)
-

0.005
(0.000)
-

0.053
(0.001)
0.251
(0.013)

0.528
(0.007)
0.258
(0.014)

0.068
(0.002)
0.271
(0.016)

0.007
(0.000)
0.921
(0.001)
0.891
(0.001)
0.232
(0.001)

340,400

31,417

188,208

2,699,633

211,329

0.345
(0.009)
0.888
(0.005)
12.209
(0.221)
4.841
(0.010)
96.169
(0.754)
9.364
(0.063)

0.271
(0.005)
0.181
(0.008)

Standard errors in parentheses
a

1997 land characteristic data

b

1996 land use returns

c

―Good land class‖ is an indicator for land classification of 1, 2, 3, or 4, indicating few restrictions on use

d

Land characteristic data only available for certain land uses, so these are means over available data:
erodibility index not available for pasture; erodibility and slope not available for pasture, range, forest,
other rural; erodibility, slope, prime, and land class not available for urban, water, and federal land.
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Table 7 also shows that 61.7% of all land that was in the CRP in 1992 was part of
an early signup wave, but only 82.1% of all land that exited CRP between 1992-1997 was
in an early signup wave (probably because of contract releases that were granted at that
time). Grass is the most common conservation cover planted on all land in CRP, and is
not planted on CRP-Exit land at a higher rate (92%) than on CRP-Eligible land (92.7%).
Consistent with intuition, most (86.3%) CRP-Eligible land stays in CRP in 1997, and
most Control-All land was farmed in 1992 (92.1%) and 1997 (89.1%). Finally, CRP-Exit
land is unconditionally more likely to be farmed than the Control-Unfarmed sample.
This result will continue to hold throughout the analyses.

Results
The data and methods employed allow an examination of land use outcome and
the adoption of conservation practices on farmed land. We will study land use outcome
both as a binary choice (cultivated or not) and as a multinomial choice. Here we can
infer causality on the part of the CRP because we have strong reason to believe that we
have matched parcels with similar characteristics. In the conservation practice results,
the sample is further restricted to land that is farmed in 1997. There are competing
reasons why ex-CRP land may adopt conservation practices at a higher rate, so we cannot
infer causality for this result.

Binary Land Use Outcome Results
To study land use, we begin with a simple binary choice model. The landowner
chooses whether to put the land into ―farming‖ (cultivated cropland) or into some other
use. Other uses include non-cultivated cropland and pasture; these uses are obviously
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important to agriculture, but cultivated cropland has a larger environmental impact so is
of particular interest. Cultivated cropland includes row and close crops. The vast
majority (95.58%) of 1997 non-cultivated cropland is used to grow hay.
We form a naïve sample of all NRI observations for which county-level rent data
are available. Analysis of this broad sample provides interesting insights, as shown in
Table 8. In three different OLS specifications,12 we use mutually exclusive dummies to
compare 1997 use of CRP land to 1997 use of other land. Specification I uses dummies
to indicate 1992 CRP participation and 1992 farming. This specification shows that land
that was in the CRP in 1992 is less likely to be farmed in 1997 than land that was farmed
in 1992 and even than land that was neither farmed nor CRP in 1992. Using the same
data set, we perform a matching analysis using 1992 CRP participation as the treatment
variable and the same explanatory variables as elements of the Mahalanobis metric and
propensity score. Using the matched sample, the estimate of average treatment effect on
the treated indicates that CRP land is 73.8% (standard error 0.014) less likely to be
farmed than all other land. This result was driven by land that was farmed in 1992 and
1997 and land that was in CRP in 1992 and 1997.

12

Results are very similar for logit and probit specifications as well; results available upon request.
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Table 8. Land Use Results with Naïve (Un-Pre-Processed) Sample
Specification I
Specification II
CRP dummy
-0.233***
(0.005)
Early CRP dummy
-0.216***
(0.006)
Late CRP dummy
-0.260***
(0.005)
CRPEXIT dummy
FARM92 dummy
N (hundreds of acres)
F
R2

0.629***
(0.005)
3,006,841
15,619.34
0.616

0.629***
(0.005)
3,006,841
19,859.11
0.616

Specification III

0.401***
(0.007)
0.791***
(0.003)
3,006,841
3,311.24
0.612

* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Standard errors in parentheses. Regressions are OLS. All included land was cultivated in 1982, is in a
county for which rent data is available, and does not enter 1997 land uses: urban/built-up, water, or federal.
Specifications control for 1997 land characteristics (prime farmland indicator, good land class indicator),
1996 land use rents and changes, region code dummies, and land characteristic x rent interactions. Survey
regressions performed with data points appropriately weighted and clustered errors.

Specification II in Table 8 replaces the CRP dummy with dummies to indicate
early CRP signup and late CRP signup, with results similar to Specification I.
Specification III in Table 8 hints at the need for pre-processing. A dummy is included to
indicate CRP exit, and this dummy has a positive coefficient. This land is more likely to
enter farming than the baseline group. The baseline group, however, is unintuitive: it
includes land that was not farmed in 1992 and land that stayed in (did not exit) CRP.
For a more interpretable result, we must look to the re-specified subsamples.
Results are shown in Table 9. The table shows the coefficient on (or the marginal effect
of) the CRP dummy. Results are shown for OLS, logit, and probit regressions, and
matching. Covariate balancing tables for matching analyses are available upon request.
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Table 9. Land Use Results with Pre-Processed Samples
Specification:
I
II
III
IV
What CRP land
Early signup Early signup Exit 1992-7
Exit 1992-7
included?
wave (CRPwave (CRP(CRP-Exit)
(CRP-Exit)
Eligible)
Eligible)
What non-CRP
All land
Not farmed
All land
Not farmed
(previously farmed)
(Control1992 (Control- (Control- 1992 (Controlland included?
All)
Unfarmed)
All)
Unfarmed)
OLS
-0.775***
-0.185***
-0.316***
0.231***
Logit (marginal effect)
-0.835***
-0.219***
-0.285***
0.275***
Probit (marginal effect)
-0.823***
-0.224***
-0.301***
0.266***
Matching (ATT)
-0.712***
-0.159***
-0.305***
0.207***
N (hundreds of acres)
2,887,997
399,719
2,731,206
242,928
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All included land was cultivated in 1982, is in a county for which rent data is available, and does not enter
1997 land uses: urban/built-up, water, or federal. Specifications control for 1997 land characteristics
(prime farmland indicator, good land class indicator), 1996 land use rents and changes, region code
dummies, and land characteristic x rent interactions. Survey regressions performed with data points
appropriately weighted and clustered errors. Matching uses Mahalanobis metric plus propensity score.

Each specification (column) in Table 9 represents a combination of a treated
(CRP) sample and a control (non-CRP) sample. The results generate consistent estimates
within each column, so the results are not driven by functional form. However, the
results change greatly between columns. This is expected, since each treatment-control
group pair represents a different question addressed to the data.
Specifications I and II in Table 9 show results using the CRP-Eligible sample
(CRP parcels that were part of early CRP signup waves) as the treatment group.
Regardless of the control (non-CRP) group chosen, the CRP-Eligible parcels are less
likely to be farmed than the counterfactuals. Recall from Table 7 that 86.3% of CRPEligible stayed in CRP. As argued in the Methods section, the comparison of the CRPEligible sample with non-CRP parcels does not address the question of post-CRP land
use since much of the eligible land stayed in the program.
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Specifications I and III in Table 9 show results using Control-All (non-CRP
parcels that were farmed in 1982) as the control group. In both cases, again, CRP parcels
are less likely to be farmed. This result is again informed by Table 7. Most of the
Control-All parcels are continuously farmed. When we compare CRP land to this land,
we are asking whether CRP makes a parcel more likely to be farmed as compared to most
of the nation’s farmland, including the best land. This may not be a causal relationship,
since it may be driven by unobservable differences in land quality and transition costs.
Specification IV in Table 9 is the most revealing. Here, CRP-Exit (land that
exited the CRP program between 1992 and 1997) is the treatment group. It is compared
to Control-Unfarmed—land that, though farmed in 1982, was in some other land use in
the intervening years. Control-Unfarmed land has been revealed, by the land use chosen
by its landowner, to be similarly low-quality as compared to CRP land and to face similar
transition costs to enter farming. Therefore, the Control-Unfarmed land is the best
counterfactual for CRP-Exit land for this research question. In these analyses, the CRPExit land is more likely to be farmed than the non-CRP land. This treatment effect is not
just statistically significant and consistent across specifications, but it is also
economically significant, at 21-28%.
To restate this result, the CRP seems to make this land 21-28% more likely to be
farmed than it would have been had it never been in the CRP. This result is expected if
the returns to agriculture have increased on this land, which in turn is expected because
CRP improves land quality. (Control-Unfarmed land should have also improved while it
was not farmed, but CRP’s period of non-farming is probably longer, and conservation
practices that cause land improvement are subsidized in CRP.)
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Is this result driven by the selective exit of only the best CRP land? If CRP-Exit
contained the upper envelope of CRP land, but Control-Unfarmed contained only very
bad land, this difference in land quality would reduce the implications of the results. To
check, we reduce the CRP and non-CRP land samples to only the best land using a
specification with only land indicated as prime farmland, and a specification with only
land that has a relatively good (unrestricted) land classification. Results are robust to
these checks, with coefficients still significant and slightly increased in magnitude
(available upon request). Of course, this check has limited power if observable
characteristics understate the differences in land characteristics. It is still likely that the
―best‖ CRP land (by unobservable characteristics) had a higher tendency to leave the
program. If this is the case, the magnitude of the effect observed is only accurate for the
parcels that actually exited; the effect could be different (most likely smaller) if parcels
were ejected from the program randomly or if the program were ended. Even so, the
tendency for CRP to cause at least some land to be more likely to be farmed is still
compelling and interesting.
As discussed in the Methods section, these results may be biased toward zero if
Control-Unfarmed land is unobservably better than CRP-Exit land or if there is a delay in
transitioning into farming, and the results may be biased upward if Control-Unfarmed
land is unobservably worse than CRP-Exit land or is in a long fallow cycle. This upward
bias is less likely because Control-Unfarmed was shown to be (on average) better in
observable qualities than CRP-Exit, and because the NRI tries to accurately record fallow
land, but it is still possible.
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We check the robustness of the matching result using Rosenbaum’s recommended
sensitivity test (Rosenbaum 2002). This test simulates conditions in which the treatment
variable (1992 CRP participation) and the outcome (1997 farming of the land) are both
driven by an unobservable factor. This test assumes that the unobservable factor
determines with certainty whether land will be farmed in 1997. The correlation between
this unobservable factor and the propensity to receive treatment (here, likelihood of being
in CRP) is varied, and the test reports the range of unobservable values for which the
matching result is still valid. When CRP-Exit land is compared to Control-All and
Control-Unfarmed land, the result is robust up to an unobservable factor of 2.7 and 2.6
respectively. That is, even if some parcels are 2.7 (or 2.6) times as likely to enter CRP
due to an unobservable factor perfectly correlated with later farming, the matching result
showing that CRP-Exit land is more likely to be farmed than Control-Unfarmed (and less
likely to be farmed than Control-All) would still indicate a positive causal effect.13 These
results do not tell us that there is such a factor; it simply indicates how strong a factor
would have to be to create these results. Since this test assumes that this unobservable
factor wholly determines farming outcome, we feel that a robustness of 2.6 is sufficiently
strong for these results to be convincing.

Multinomial Land Use Outcome Results
Cultivated cropping is the land use of greatest interest. However, it is also
interesting to learn how CRP participation affects the entire distribution of final land
uses. Table 10 presents multinomial logit land use outcome results. The specifications

13

When CRP-Eligible parcels are compared to either control group, the result is robust up to an
unobservable factor of at least 5.
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(columns) again correspond to pairs of treatment and control groups. Land use categories
were: cultivated cropland, non-cultivated cropland, pasture, CRP, and other.14 When
CRP-Eligible is compared to either control group (Specifications I and II in Table 10),
the results are mainly driven by the tendency of this CRP land, while probably eligible to
exit, to stay in the program. CRP-Eligible land is much more likely to be in CRP in
1997, and less likely to be cultivated, than the control group. Also, when compared to the
Control-Unfarmed group, CRP-Eligible land is less likely to become non-cultivated
cropland or pasture, which again is because most of CRP-Eligible stayed in the CRP (and
much of Control-Unfarmed became or remained non-cultivated cropland or pasture).

Table 10. Land Use Multinomial Logit Results
Specification:
I
II
What CRP land
Early signup
Early signup
included?
wave (CRPwave (CRPEligible)
Eligible)
What non-CRP
All land
Not farmed
(previously farmed)
(Control-All) 1992 (Controlland included?
Unfarmed)
Cultivated cropland
-0.832***
-0.252***
Non-cultivated
-0.020***
-0.251***
cropland
Pasture
0.001
-0.245***
CRP
0.848***
0.851***
Other
0.004***
-0.104***
N (hundreds of acres)
2,887,997
399,719
F
3,169.99
722.44

III
Exit 1992-7
(CRP-Exit)

IV
Exit 1992-7
(CRP-Exit)

All land
(Control-All)a
-0.274***
0.059***

Not farmed
1992 (ControlUnfarmed)a
0.270***
-0.155***

0.126***
N/A
0.090***
2,712,792
213.20

-0.095***
N/A
-0.019***
241,650
51.66

* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Cells show marginal effects of 1992 CRP status dummy on each land use. All included land was cultivated
in 1982, is in a county for which rent data is available, and does not enter 1997 land uses: urban/built-up,
water, or federal. Specifications control for 1997 land characteristics (prime farmland indicator, good land
class indicator), 1996 land use rents and changes, and region code dummies. Survey regressions performed
with data points appropriately weighted and clustered errors.
a

For these regressions only, both Control groups exclude land that becomes CRP in 1997 (0.67% of
Control-All and 0.53% of Control-Unfarmed).
14

―Other‖ includes rangeland, forest, and ―other rural‖; these uses make up small but significant elements
of CRP-Eligible (2.19%), CRP-Exit (14.63%), Control-All (2.22%), and Control-Unfarmed (17.55%).
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In Specifications III and IV of Table 10, in which land that exits CRP is compared
to non-CRP land, the results again depend on the set of control parcels used. When CRPExit is compared to Control-All (Specification III), we see again that the ex-CRP land is
less likely to be farmed, and that the ex-CRP land has a greater tendency to go into
pasture, non-cultivated cropland (hay), and other uses. This is unsurprising: as discussed
above, most land that exits CRP is planted with grasses as a conservation cover, so the
conversion to pasture is trivial, and the conversion to hay or other non-cultivated uses
may also be inexpensive. When CRP-Exit is compared to Control-Unfarmed in
Specification IV, the ex-CRP land is 27% more likely to become cultivated cropland.
This result is similar to the binary model estimates. The CRP-Exit parcels are less likely
than Control-Unfarmed parcels to be non-cultivated cropland or pasture in 1997. This is
probably because over 80% of Control-Unfarmed land had already been in non-cultivated
cropland (47.54%) or pasture (36.25%) in 1992.
Both pasture and non-cultivated cropland convert to cultivated cropland at
relatively high rates: 44.8% of 1992 non-cultivated cropland, and 28.2% of 1992 pasture,
was farmed in 1997. The high rates of conversion to cropping over a five-year period
demonstrated in these data may indicate some error in the NRI’s verification of fallow
cycles. We previously noted that (the issue of long fallows aside) CRP parcels have less
opportunity to transition than do Control-Unfarmed parcels because CRP contracts end in
1996. This under-measurement of transition may be particularly large because CRP-Exit
parcels that do not enter farming tend to enter non-cultivated cropland and pasture at a
relatively high rate, and may therefore transition into farming in the future. However,
again, this would bias CRP’s tendency to enter cultivated cropland toward zero.
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However, since the control (non-CRP) parcels of greatest interest were
uncultivated in 1992 just as the CRP parcels were, transition costs are held constant
between the treatment and control groups. Further, while the ex-CRP parcels exited the
program in or around 1996, the control parcels were bound by no contract and could
make any transition that was profitable at any time after the 1992 observation. This
would bias the results to make the ex-CRP parcels look less likely to be farmed, and our
result is robust to this direction of bias.

Conservation Practice Results
The 1997 NRI sample contains data on whether any of 22 different conservation
practices was adopted on cultivated cropland, summarized in Table 7 for the populations
of interest. Of all acreage cultivated in 1997, 22.77% was engaged in some conservation
practice. The most popular practices were terraces (6.2% of land), contour farming
(5.76%), grassed waterways (4.28%), and surface drainage (4.02%). Most of the
conservation practices help to conserve water and/or reduce erosion. In some cases, these
practices are strongly recommended or required for land that is very sensitive (e.g.,
highly erodible). There are government programs at various levels to promote and
subsidize practices of this type.
Is ex-CRP land that becomes cultivated cropland more likely than other land to
adopt these conservation practices? Table 7 shows that unconditionally, cultivated exCRP land appears more likely to adopt conservation practices than either cultivated
Control-All or cultivated Control-Unfarmed land. However, this unconditional result is
confounded by differences in land quality and other factors.
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The conservation practice analysis can be performed in much the same way that
the land use outcome analysis was performed. However, since some low-quality land is
required to adopt conservation practices, the sample must first be reduced to include only
land that is not highly erodible, with an erodibility index of 8 or less (results without the
erodibility index restriction are similar, and available on request).
Even after this extra restriction on the samples, causality cannot be attributed to
the CRP. While significant results could point to a causal role for the CRP, they could
also indicate that the kinds of landowners who sign their land up for CRP are also the
kinds of people who will adopt conservation practices (because of personal proclivity,
better knowledge of government programs, or variation in local programs that promote
conservation). The land use model abstracts from landowner characteristics in a way that
is fairly plausible for land use outcomes, since market returns should be strong drivers of
land use. However, in the decision to adopt conservation practices that assumption seems
dubious for a number of reasons. For example, government programs are not always
easy for potential participants to understand, and idiosyncratic landowner information
may not make its way into market prices. Even without clear causality, however, the
results are still interesting.
Table 11 shows the coefficient of (or marginal effect for) CRP participation on
the adoption of some conservation practice in 1997. The columns again represent
different combinations of ex-CRP and control (non-CRP) land, with data restricted to
non-highly-erodible land that was cultivated in 1997. In Specification I, the control
group includes the portion of Control-All (all land farmed in 1982) that was farmed in
1997. For this comparison, the CRP land is not significantly more nor less likely to adopt
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a conservation practice. (Most of Control-All was farmed in 1992, but we cannot know
which parcels adopted a conservation practice in 1992 because data on conservation
practices for 1992 are not available.)

Table 11. Conservation Practice Results
Specification I
What CRP land included?
Exit 1992-7 (CRP-Exit)
What non-CRP (previously
All land (Control-All)
farmed) land included?
OLS
0.018
Logit
0.026
Probit
0.026
Matching
0.003

Specification II
Exit 1992-7 (CRP-Exit)
Not farmed 1992
(Control-Unfarmed)
0.045**
0.043**
0.043*
0.076**

* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Only non-highly-erodible land included
Land was in the categories described in the text but only non-highly erodible (erodibility index of 8 or
lower). All included land was cultivated in 1982, is in a county for which rent data is available, and does
not enter 1997 land uses: urban/built-up, water, or federal. Specifications control for 1997 land
characteristics (prime farmland indicator, good land class indicator, slope, and erodibility index), 1996 land
use rents and changes, region code dummies, and land characteristic x rent interactions. Survey regressions
performed with data points appropriately weighted and clustered errors. Matching uses Mahalanobis metric
plus propensity score.

For Specification II of Table 11, the control group includes the portion of ControlUnfarmed (land farmed in 1982 but not 1992) that was farmed in 1997. In this
specification, both CRP and non-CRP parcels faced a transition back into farming.
Adopting a new conservation practice for the first time requires some investment of time
and money, particularly in planning and design, so transition costs into farming with
conservation practices are greater than transition costs into farming without conservation
practices. CRP parcels are 4-8% more likely to adopt a conservation practice than this
very similar land. This is large relative to the baseline adoption rate of conservation
practices of 18.1% for this land.

61

We perform another Rosenbaum test for sensitivity to unobservable factors, and
the conservation practice result is very sensitive to unobservable factors that increase the
CRP signup rate by as little as 40%. This leaves open the possibility that these results are
driven by unobservable selection.

Conclusion
The Conservation Reserve Program uses selective retirement of agricultural land
to protect the environment and to increase long-term agricultural productivity. There is a
natural tension between this program’s goals. The conflict between the agricultural and
environmental goals of the CRP is particularly notable in land’s disposition after it leaves
the CRP. We seek causal effects of the CRP on later land use, and we find that CRP
participation seems to cause land to be 21-28% more likely to be farmed than it would
have been had it never been in the program. This result is congruent with findings that
the CRP improves land quality, because that improvement would increase the returns to
cropping. The CRP may act as a long, subsidized fallow period for some landowners.
The innovation of our analysis is the use of a sample re-specification step. This
reduces bias by using the analyst’s knowledge to restrict the treatment and control groups
to the most appropriate parcels. Unobservable factors determine the potential returns to
cropping and other land uses, so estimates of land use model parameters and elasticities
may be biased if calculated using incomparable parcels. Comparable parcels can be
identified by their use: land that is similarly low-quality and faces similar transition costs
(i.e. land with similar unobservable characteristics) may drop out of regular cropping.
We find that treatment effect estimation is very sensitive to the use of
inappropriate data samples. Once an appropriate sample is specified, however, results are
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robust to different econometric specifications. This sensitivity to data set specification
may also be applicable to the calibrations used, for example, in general equilibrium
simulations. On a related note, we should be aware that the 21-28% increase in
likelihood of farming is an average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) and that it is
only applicable to parcels that exited CRP between 1992 and 1997. It would be incorrect
to infer that the same rate of increase in cultivation would occur on CRP parcels that did
not exit by 1997, or on parcels that may enter CRP in the future. Notably, it would be
inappropriate to infer that if the CRP were dissolved, the end use of all ejected parcels
would reflect a 21-28% increase in the likelihood of farming. However, the results are
still interesting in indicating that at least some CRP participants take advantage of CRPinduced land improvements by farming their land more intensively.
Is the increase in cultivation on these ex-CRP parcels socially desirable? The
welfare effects of this increased tendency to farm are ambiguous, so this question cannot
be answered without use of a social welfare function that places explicit weight on the
opposing environmental and agricultural benefits of the CRP. However, some of the
environmental damage that could result from this increased tendency to farm is mitigated
by farmed ex-CRP land’s increased tendency to adopt conservation practices.
Finally, we might infer from these results that farmers are being paid too much to
conserve their land since they are getting productivity gains from the improved land, and
that government payments are therefore inefficiently high. On the other hand, if the
bidding process were incentive-compatible, farmers’ CRP bids would be reduced by their
expectation of productivity benefits. If this were the case, inefficiency would be reduced.

63

Chapter III: Learning from Mistakes
What Do Inconsistent Choices Over Risk Tell Us?
Introduction
We all make mistakes. We take longer to complete tasks than we expected, or we
make the wrong choice because we are in a hurry. Psychologists have long recognized
this problem and regularly include multiple questions in surveys that ask the same thing
in order to increase reliability. In experimental economics, the presence of inconsistent
choices is common, particularly when experiments are taken to the field. The view in
economics has been to either ignore subjects with inconsistent choices or to make
specialized assumptions on the nature of mistakes and estimate the parameters of interest.
We take the view that mistakes can be inherently interesting and informative with regard
to subjects' decision-making rules and cognitive costs. We are particularly interested in
how mistakes made in risk decisions can explain financial decisions. We find that
measures of error are correlated with demographics and financial instrument choices.
This paper shows that there is much to be learned from mistakes.
Several researchers (Birnbaum and Schmidt 2008; Carbone and Hey 2000;
Harless and Camerer 1994; Hey 2005; Hey and Orme 1994; Loomes, Moffatt, and
Sugden 2002) have shown that assumptions on the source and nature of mistakes are not
innocuous in the identification of behavior patterns. Much of this literature also shows,
by collecting repeated observations on the same individuals, that the way subjects
commit mistakes (or are inconsistent) is heterogeneous.

64

We use risk experiments that allow inconsistent choices to be made. We define a
mistake as a choice that does not reflect an individual’s true preferences. We use the
results of these experiments to study mistakes and then link those mistakes to financial
decisions made in the marketplace. Participants are drawn from a random sample of the
adult population in Rwanda, thus providing important variation in demographics and
economic outcomes. This setting is well-suited to our study because subjects face risky
decisions regularly in their daily lives and have access to a variety of (mainly informal)
financial instruments. The sample is typical of adults found in urban and rural areas in
many developing countries. The experiment is designed so that with fairly unrestrictive
assumptions on utility, choices inconsistent with most reasonable theories can be detected
in the data. We find that risk aversion alone is a poor predictor of decisions, but mistakes
and risk aversion correlate with the use of certain financial instruments, notably those that
serve as safety nets.
Mistakes, or inconsistent choices, have been linked to non-cognitive abilities such
as motivation, attention, and patience. Additionally, both cognitive and non-cognitive
abilities have been linked to outcomes such as employment, wages, obesity, smoking, and
saving decisions (e.g., Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua 2006; Segal 2009). The use of
economic experiments to look at cognitive and non-cognitive ability is more limited.
Benjamin, Brown and Shapiro (2006) find that students with high standardized test scores
are less likely to exhibit extreme risk aversion in small stakes gambles (which some
consider irrational), and Sunde et al. (2010) find people with lower IQ’s are more risk
averse and impatient. Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin (2006) look at hypothetical survey
questions on time preferences and find that those who make time inconsistent choices are
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more likely to take up a commitment savings product in the Philippines. In this research,
we ask whether inconsistent choices in risk experiments relate to patterns of financial
decisions taken in the marketplace. We don’t know what pattern of financial decisions is
optimal for any person, but if we find that tendency to err is correlated with financial
decision-making, this would imply either that these subjects are making errors in their
financial lives or that they are hedging to protect themselves against their own errors.
Decision-making inconsistencies have been observed in several experimental
studies, including decisions over risk (e.g., Holt and Laury 2002), health (Stockman
2006), and time preferences (Castillo et al. 2009). Prasad and Salmon (2007) find, using
a risk experiment similar to ours, that subjects who make inconsistent choices over risk
earn less than those who make consistent decisions in a principal-agent experiment.
In previous research, these inconsistencies have been frequently ignored, under
the assumption that they are uninformative noise. Alternatively, choices are restricted so
that inconsistent behavior cannot be observed. In risk experiments, this can be done by
giving the subject only a single decision to make. For example, Binswanger (1980), one
of the first to use such a method, gives a menu of lotteries over which the subject chooses
one. Subjects can be asked to pick a point at which they switch from risky to safe
lotteries (see Harrison and Rutstrom 2008; Tanaka, Camerer, and Nguyen 2010).
Andersen et al. (2006) use an iterative procedure to hone in on the subject’s switch point,
and, consequentially, subjects make significantly fewer unexpected choices. The
advantage of these methods is that they provide clear estimates of risk aversion by
eliminating the possibility of mistakes.
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We are interested in knowing the relationship between mistakes, lottery-measured
risk aversion, and financial decisions. Results in the literature relating lottery-measured
risk preferences to economic decisions have been mixed. Eckel et al. (2007) find that
risk-averse individuals are more likely to take up experimentally-provided education
financing. Bellemare and Shearer (2006) find that risk aversion is correlated with job
sorting, and Dohmen et al. (2010) find that lottery measures of risk do not relate to risky
behaviors but a general risk question does. Harrison, List, and Towe (2007) argue that the
reason for these mixed results may be background risk.
Our results are surprising and may offer additional insight into the existing results
relating risk aversion to important outcomes. While we find no correlation between risk
aversion and outcomes, we do find one when we also control for mistakes. Absent
mistakes, as we would expect, risk-averse subjects are more likely to be in a savings
group and less likely to take an informal loan. Risk preferences interact with the
tendency to make mistakes in significant and sensible ways. As risk aversion increases,
those who are more likely to make mistakes become less likely to belong to a savings
group and more likely to take out an informal loan. Those who make mistakes seem to
be missing out on potentially beneficial opportunities or taking on risks when they should
not. Making mistakes in one task may be linked to less than optimal behavior in another.
Being able to observe these types of behavioral biases is essential to understanding
financial decisions.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes financial decisions
people make in Rwanda. Section 3 describes the experiment and defines inconsistent
choices. Section 4 describes the data and presents the results. Section 5 concludes.
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Financial Instruments in Rwanda
The formal financial sector in Rwanda is limited and is consistently rated as one
of the worst in the world (World Bank Group Doing Business Project 2007). Because of
this, many Rwandans rely on informal channels for credit. We will look at three common
types of informal credit (savings groups, insurance groups and informal loans) and formal
credit offered through banks and credit unions.
Savings groups (tontines) are rotating credit associations that allow members to
pool risk, keep precautionary savings, and have access to credit. These groups are
common and popular in Rwanda. Members deposit a fixed amount of money at a fixed
interval (typically monthly). Once every interval, one member of the group receives all
the money deposited by the members. Members may leave the group without penalty
once the cycle in which all group members receive the pool of money is complete.
Groups vary in size and in interval length (e.g., monthly or every two months). It has
been noted (e.g., Besley 1995) that tontines may serve risk-sharing functions for
members who have negative shocks. We expect risk-averse individuals to be more likely
to join this kind of group.
Insurance groups (groupes d’entraide) exist in two general forms. The first is a
rotating work group for construction or agricultural work. Members help each other by
exchanging labor. The second offers financial assistance in the case of a bad shock like
death or illness. It functions as insurance. More generally, the group may offer moral
support. Unfortunately, the data we have do not distinguish between these two general
forms. These groups sometimes also have a religious component to them because many
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are organized by churches. Members typically pay a monthly fee to belong. Since the
risk-pooling nature of these groups is not necessarily monetary, we do not expect risk
aversion over money to be as strongly correlated with membership.
Informal loans are widespread in Rwanda. They are usually short-term and small,
and they are largely used for immediate consumption smoothing. Most are store credit or
cash loans from family and friends. These loans are almost always interest free, but they
are given with an expectation that the favor will be reciprocated. Default on these loans
is risky: it may close doors to future borrowing and generally damage relationships with
friends and family. Because of the obligation involved and the high cost of default, we
expect risk-averse individuals to be less likely to take out these loans.
Formal credit is not widely accessible because of large financial barriers. To be
eligible to apply for a formal loan, an individual must pay an application fee and maintain
an account in the bank or credit union. Minimum deposits in banks are often very high
relative to Rwandan incomes, and membership in a credit union requires paying a small
fee. Credit unions are more accessible than banks for the poor since the membership fee
is far lower than the minimum balance at a bank. Many poor people become credit union
members precisely to get access to credit. Formal banks and credit unions are relatively
stable; however, before 2000, credit unions had a reputation for making loans and not
asking that they be paid back. Since 2000, regulation has made credit unions more
accountable and stable. In this era, the country has been much more politically stable
than in previous decades (after 1994’s horrific Rwandan genocide). Trust in the
government and in institutions in general is still weak, but there is some trust in the
financial sector. Formal loans are primarily used for business and construction, rather
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than consumption smoothing. It is not clear how risk aversion will affect the probability
of taking out a formal loan because the barriers to entry clearly select a certain segment
of the population. This population might be relatively risk averse or risk seeking.

Experiment
The experiment was done in conjunction with a 2002 World Council of Credit
Unions survey on the economic activities and household characteristics of a random
sample of credit union members and non-members in seven locations across Rwanda. In
each location, fifty members and fifty non-members were interviewed, for a total of 700
respondents. Members were randomly selected from lists of active credit union members,
and non-members were randomly selected from neighborhoods served by the credit
union. Survey respondents were at least 18 years old and were asked questions about
household demographics, economic activities of household members, and credit use.
Interviews were conducted in Kinyarwanda, the primary Rwandan language, by Rwandan
enumerators.15 The enumerators were trained and tested by the experimenters.
At the end of the survey, each respondent was asked to complete two lottery
experiments. One set of lotteries (which we will call the gain lotteries) had only positive
earnings, and the other (the gain-loss lotteries) had positive and negative earnings. We
chose these payment structures for the following reasons. The gain payment structure is
similar to many experiments in the literature (e.g., Binswanger 1980). The gain-loss
structure better mimics the type of risky outcomes an individual might face in his day-today life. We will see that the latter payment structure better explains economic decisions.

15

For a complete description of the data and survey design, refer to Petrie (2002).
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Of the 700 respondents, 15 received pilot treatments that were not designed to
generate usable data, and another 62 were unable or unwilling to complete the full lottery
experiment, so 623 individuals provided risk preference data. Of those, 442 received a
treatment that presented a menu of five lotteries at once and asked the subject to choose
one (similar to Binswanger 1980). This five-pair simultaneous presentation treatment, by
design, did not allow the subjects to make mistakes. This will serve as a comparison
treatment when we look at how risk measures predict financial decisions. The remaining
181 subjects received sequential binary-choice lotteries that did permit mistakes. Eightytwo subjects participated in a treatment with low payoff levels (55 with hypothetical and
27 with real payments) and 99 saw a treatment with high payoffs (all hypothetical).
The 181 participants of the sequential-choice lottery game are similar on
observable characteristics to the larger survey population of 700 individuals. All 181 of
these subjects lived either in the capital Kigali or in the towns of Gitarama or Butare in
the south of Rwanda. The survey population and the sequential-choice lottery participants
have similar gender ratios (39.0% female for the sequential-choice lottery participants
and 39.4% for the survey population), average ages (36.6 and 37.2, respectively), and
average monthly per capita incomes (30,897 RWF and 34,520 RWF, respectively). Like
the survey population, 93% of the sequential-choice lottery participants are literate.
Compared to the 2002 official Rwandan national census, the survey population is similar
on many demographic dimensions. However, the survey population is slightly richer and
more literate than the national average in Rwanda. This may be because credit union
members, who made up 2% of the Rwandan population, were oversampled.
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Experiment Design
In the sequential-choice experiment, subjects face a series of five pairs of
lotteries, each with 50-50 odds, and are asked to choose one lottery (A or B) in each pair.
The lottery pairs are shown in Table 12; the left half shows the low-payoff lotteries and
the right half shows the high-payoff lotteries. The gain and gain-loss lotteries are
increasing in expected payoff and variance, and in each pair, lottery B has a lower
expected payoff and variance. Also, in each subsequent pair, option B has the same
payoffs as option A in the previous pair. If choices are consistent, this lottery exercise is
equivalent to presenting subjects six lotteries simultaneously and asking them to choose
one.

Table 12. Lottery Treatment Payoffs (in Rwandan Francs, 500 RWF=$1 US*)
Low Stakes (Real and Hypothetical)
High Stakes (Hypothetical only)
Gain Lotteries
Gain Lotteries
A
B
A
B
(700, 400)
(500, 500)
(1650, 1000)
(1250, 1250)
G1
G1
(900, 300)
(700, 400)
(2050, 750)
(1650, 1000)
G2
G2
(1100, 200)
(900, 300)
(2450, 500)
(2050, 750)
G3
G3
(1300, 100)
(1100, 200)
(2850, 250)
(2450, 500)
G4
G4
(1500, 0)
(1300, 100)
(3250, 0)
(2850, 250)
G5
G5

L1
L2
L3
L4
L5

Gain-Loss Lotteries
A
B
(700, -100)
(500, 0)
(900, -200)
(700, -100)
(1100, -300)
(900, -200)
(1300, -400)
(1100, -300)
(1500, -500)
(1300, -400)

L1
L2
L3
L4
L5

Gain-Loss Lotteries
A
B
(1650, -200)
(1250, 0)
(2050, -400)
(1650, -200)
(2450, -600)
(2050, -400)
(2850, -800)
(2450, -600)
(3250, -1000)
(2850, -800)

* At the time of this research, median per capita annual income in Rwanda was 118,000 RWF, according to
the US Department of State, so 500 RWF was roughly equivalent to a day’s wage. From our survey data,
median monthly per capita income and expense measures were between 15,000 – 18,000 RWF, and this
would imply a daily wage (based on 5 working-days a week) of 691- 830 RWF in our sample.
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A risk-neutral or risk-loving individual would always choose A. An individual
with a concave utility function would start with option A and switch to lottery B as
expected payoffs and variance increase and continue to choose option B. Since the
subject’s ―switching point‖ may occur above or below the wealth range of the lotteries
presented to the subjects, strongly risk-averse subjects may always choose option B,
while less risk-averse subjects may always choose option A.
The format of the experiment is similar to Holt and Laury (Holt and Laury 2002),
hereafter HL, but with several key differences. HL keep payoffs constant and vary the
probabilities of receiving the high and low outcomes. In our experiment, the probability
is always 50-50, which is easier to administer and perhaps to understand, and the payoffs
are varied. Also, HL present the lotteries all at once to the subjects. In our experiment,
lottery pairs are presented sequentially. Finally, in addition to lotteries over gains, we
also present lotteries over gains and losses (as in Laury and Holt 2005).

Experiment Implementation
Before they start making decisions, subjects are told that one of the five lotteries
in each set will be randomly chosen for implementation by pulling a number between one
and five from a hat and then a coin will be flipped to determine payment. After the
procedures are explained, the subject is allowed to practice briefly with a sample lottery
pair. Then all lottery pairs are presented one at a time and in the same order for all
subjects. For example, in the gain lottery, subjects are first presented with the payoffs for
G1 and are asked if they would prefer lottery A or lottery B. Next, they are presented the
payoffs for G2 and asked to choose between A and B, and so on. They must choose one
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of the lotteries in each case. They are not allowed to declare indifference. Once subjects
have made decisions for the gain lotteries, they are presented with the gain-loss lotteries
one by one and in the same order.
When all lotteries have been completed, one lottery is randomly chosen from the
gain sequence and another from the gain-loss sequence. A coin is flipped for the chosen
lottery in each sequence. If the coin turns up heads, the subject would earn the first
number in the payoff pair for the chosen lottery. For example, if lottery G3 was
randomly chosen in the low payoff treatment and the subject chose option A for G3, then
if the coin flip turned up tails, the subject would earn 200 RWF.
Subjects in the real-payment treatment were given 500 RWF as a show-up fee and
paid the outcomes of the coin tosses for the gain and the gain-loss lotteries. They were
paid in cash. Subjects in the hypothetical treatments were not paid. After the two coin
flips, they were told what they would have earned had they been paid.16
The majority of the subjects received a hypothetical-payment treatment because
of limited funding. There is some debate in the literature as to whether real payoffs are
necessary to incentivize choices in lottery experiments. Camerer and Hogarth (1999)
note, in a review of 74 experiments, that the effect of real payoffs in risk experiments is
unclear—in some cases there is no effect, and in some cases subjects appear more or less
risk averse. Ortmann and Hertwig (2006), while noting the importance of financial
incentives, emphasize the importance of a ―do-it-both-ways‖ rule so that experimenters
can compare results of financially motivated and non-motivated treatments. This is what
16

While they were not paid, subjects in the hypothetical treatments evinced an interest in the outcome of
the coin toss. That is, they seemed to care about their hypothetical earnings. This suggests they paid
attention to their decisions.
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we do in this paper. We test for a significant behavioral difference in subject choices
between the real and hypothetical treatments, and find none. Therefore, we pool the data.

Defining Anomalous Choices
Under relatively unrestrictive assumptions on preferences over risk, the pattern of
predicted choices in the sequential-choice experiment is as follows. A risk-neutral or
risk-seeking subject would always choose lottery A. A risk-averse subject may choose
one of six lottery patterns, AAAAA, AAAAB, AAABB, AABBB, ABBBB, or BBBBB,
in order of increasing risk aversion. If a subject ever chooses B (the safe lottery) in one
lottery pair and then subsequently chooses A (the risky lottery), his choice pattern is
inconsistent with most theories. Relative to a given lottery, he has now expressed a
preference for both a safer lottery and a riskier lottery. As shown in Appendix C, such a
pattern of choices is not predicted by Expected Utility Theory, the Dual Theory (which is
even more restrictive, only allowing the patterns AAAAA and BBBBB), or Expected
Value theory (which only allows AAAAA). As the Appendix also shows, with a few
additional (but reasonable) assumptions, Rank Dependent Theory, Prospect Theory, and
Cumulative Prospect Theory predict the same six lottery choice patterns. Thus, we argue
that choice patterns containing a switch from B to A are mistakes in the sense that they
are unlikely to reflect a subject’s actual preferences over risk.
If a choice violating these patterns—that is, a choice pattern in which there is a
switch from B to A—represents true preferences and our assumptions are met, there are
three possible explanations. First, he could be truly indifferent between one or both pairs
of lotteries. This would require a flat utility function over wealth, and we consider this
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rather unlikely. Second, he could be ―practically‖ indifferent, in the sense that the
difference between his utility from option A is close to his utility from option B—so
close that he cannot detect the difference. This is quite possible, but we would consider
this a mistake because the decision does not reflect true preferences because cognitive
costs have (in a sense) interfered with the expression of those preferences. Third, he
could have a ―humpy‖ indifference function, with an inflection point in the range of these
lotteries. Figure 6 uses expected utility is used to demonstrate an example in which a
sure thing of 500 is preferred to a lottery with equal-odds outcomes of 400 and 700, but a
lottery with equal-odds outcomes of 300 and 900 is also preferred to the 400-700 lottery.
A ―humpy‖ utility function has been proposed (notably in Friedman and Savage 1948),
particularly for the case of consumption commitments (Chetty and Szeidl 2007), but it
seems unlikely that there should be a hump in just the right place to explain switchingback behavior in our lotteries.

Figure 6. Preferences Over Wealth to Explain Inconsistency
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There are three aspects of the experiment that could cause some unexpected
behavior, but neither should cause inconsistent ―switching-back.‖ First, since two
decisions will be implemented, subjects could make their decisions as if putting together
a risk portfolio. This should make subjects choose riskier options, but consistently.
Second, since one gain and one gain-loss lottery is implemented at random, errors may
occur due to faulty compounding of lotteries. However, that should simply make people
behave in a consistent, but more risk-averse, fashion (Holt 1986). Third, there may be
order effects since the gain-loss lotteries are always performed after the gain lotteries.
This is not a problem for this analysis because we do not try to compare choices over
gain to choices over gain-loss.
As discussed briefly above, indifference between lottery pairs could generate
some switches from safe to risky lotteries (switches that we consider inconsistent). For
example, if a person is truly indifferent between a pair of lotteries, he may choose more
or less randomly between the two. However, it is not clear how to interpret widespread
indifference from the point of view of theory. If a person’s preferences are such that
lottery B, with a low expected value and a low variance, and lottery A, with a higher
expected value and a higher preference, are exactly (or nearly) indifferent, this means that
the increase in expected value gained with A perfectly offsets the disutility imposed by
the increased variance. While this may explain a small number of inconsistent switches,
it is unreasonable to expect that this would be the case in a large number of such switches
as we see in this experiment, especially since some subjects exhibit ―double switchbacks‖ (switch B to A twice). Alternately, a utility function that does not vary with
wealth will generate indifference across all lotteries, which may cause people to choose
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randomly and thus apparently make inconsistent switches. This also seems unlikely. It
may be more realistic to interpret ―indifference‖ as an inability to know one’s own
preference or an error in evaluating the lotteries; a person has real preferences between
each lottery pair, but fails in some way to access those preferences (perhaps because of
cognitive costs) and thus falls back on random choice or a rule of thumb for some lottery
pairs. This kind of indifference can also be considered a mistake.

Results
We look first at inconsistent choices. Then, we examine measurements of risk
aversion and estimations of mistakes, and finally, we relate risk aversion measures and
inconsistent choice to financial decisions.

Inconsistent Choices
Of the 181 people who completed the sequential choice lottery treatment, roughly
55% made at least one inconsistent switch over gains or losses. This is a similar
percentage to that found with the same instrument in a random sample of adults in Peru.17
Table 13 illustrates the distribution of lottery choices across predicted patterns and
inconsistent switches. Because the real and hypothetical distributions for low payoffs are
not significantly different, we pool these two treatments.18 We can conclude that either
17

Peru results are from a work in progress. The hypothetical choices from the Peru instrument (which
allowed indifference, allowed subjects to review and change decisions, and included both hypothetical and
paid lotteries) found 52% of choices over gains and 44% of choices over gain-loss were inconsistent. In
other research, inconsistent choices made up varying percentages of choices: Holt and Laury (2002) found
13% in hypothetical choices with students, Stockman (2006) found 11% in hypothetical choices with
adults, Castillo, Ferraro, Jordan and Petrie (2009) found 33% in paid choices with 13-year olds, and Prasad
and Salmon (2007) found 30% in paid choices with students (presenting lotteries sequentially as we did).
18
A Fisher’s exact test between real and hypothetical stakes for equal distributions over gains has a pvalue=0.431 and over gain-loss, p-value=0.439.
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mistakes are not caused by lack of financial incentives, or the real lotteries are not
sufficiently incentivized. Since the pay from low stakes lotteries is on the order of one to
two days pay for our subjects, we believe the latter to be the case. However, mistakes are
the topic of this study, so our results are still interesting even if mistakes are due to a
failure of saliency (note that the difference in expected value of two lotteries in each pair
is actually rather low). There is, however, a significant difference between high and low
payoff treatments. High stakes may be easier to focus on or may be a cognitively easier
task. HL also found that higher-stakes lotteries resulted in a lower tendency to choose
inconsistently (5.5%).

Table 13. Distribution of Choices over Sequential-Choice Lottery Treatments (in percent)

Choice Pattern
AAAAA
AAAAB
AAABB
AABBB
ABBBB
BBBBB
One anomalous switch
Two anomalous switches
Total

Gain Lotteries
Low
High
All
Payoffs* Payoffs
12.7
9.8
15.2
11.1
2.4
18.2
5.5
4.9
6.1
3.3
1.2
5.1
6.1
3.7
8.1
7.7
4.9
10.1
47.0
58.5
37.4
6.6
14.6
0.0
181
82
99

Gain-Loss Lotteries
Low
High
All
Payoffs*
Payoffs
8.8
12.2
6.1
2.8
3.7
2.0
0.6
0.0
1.0
1.7
1.2
2.0
4.4
3.7
5.1
27.1
8.5
42.4
42.0
48.8
36.4
12.7
22.0
5.1
181
82
99

* Real and hypothetical payoff treatments are combined.

There are other possible categorizations that could capture people who are
consistent with some other decision mechanism. For example, a subject may use a ―rule
of thumb‖ wherein he chooses all A’s or all B’s but can deviate once (to test the waters).
Using this categorization only helped explain 30 more choices (16.6%) over gains and 37

79

(20.4%) more choices over losses, leaving 67 (37.0%) choices over gains and 62 (34.3%)
over losses still classified as inconsistent. No simple ―rule of thumb‖ categorization
explained a larger number of inconsistent choices, so all choices thus categorized remain
identified as inconsistent.
How do subjects’ choices change between gain and loss lotteries? We categorize
the choice pattern AAAAA as ―consistent risk loving,‖ the patterns AAAAB, AAABB,
AABBB, and ABBBB as ―consistent risk averse,‖ and the pattern BBBBB as ―consistent
strong risk averse.‖ The shaded region of Table 14 shows the pattern of consistent and
inconsistent choices over gains and losses. Of those choosing consistently, most are
strongly risk-averse in the loss lottery. Conditioning on having made a consistent choice
over gain and loss, 10% were more risk-averse over gain than over loss, 38% were
equally risk-averse over gain and loss, and 52% were more risk-averse over loss than
over gain. This means that of the subjects that made consistent choices, a little over half
made choices consistent with a concave utility function over gains and losses. In terms of
inconsistencies, roughly half of the subjects made the same number of inconsistent
choices over gain as over losses. More people made two inconsistent switches over
losses than over gains.
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Choices over gain

Table 14. Choices over Gain and Loss (Numbers of Subjects)

Consistent
strong riskaverse
Consistent
risk-averse
Consistent
risk-loving
Inconsistent
one-switch
Inconsistent
two-switch
Total

Consistent
strong riskaverse
9

Choices over loss
Consistent Consistent
riskriskaverse
loving
1
0

Inconsistent
one-switch

Inconsistent Total
two-switch

3

1

14

14

6

4

21

2

47

9

3

4

5

2

23

16

6

8

40

15

85

1

1

0

7

3

12

49

17

16

76

23

181

Risk Aversion
The overwhelming presence of inconsistent choices makes a risk measure based
on a switching point from risky to safe lotteries in our data problematic, since many
subjects have multiple switching points. It would be possible to use a structural model
that allows for error to determine a risk aversion parameter and an error parameter either
for the population or for subpopulations (for example, using a finite mixture model).
However, we wish to obtain a measure of error and of risk aversion for each subject and
to do so with the fewest possible assumptions on the form of preferences. As a result, we
will generate a simple proxy index of risk aversion and (as discussed in the next section)
estimate a probability of having made a mistake for each subject.
Our proxy for risk aversion (as in HL) is simply the number of B (safe) choices
the person made. This gives us a risk-aversion measure over gain and one over gain-loss
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for each subject. The higher this measure, the more risk-averse the person is. So that the
risk aversion measure for subjects who participated in sequential-choice lotteries can be
compared to that of subjects who participated in five-pair simultaneous presentation
lotteries, both were normalized to fall in the range from 0 to 1.19 This allows us to see if
the two methods produce different measures of risk aversion.
The treatment that forces consistency (five-pair) yields risk measures that are
significantly higher than in the treatment that allows for inconsistent choices (sequential
choice). To compare similar payoffs, we restrict our discussion to the comparison of the
five-pair treatment’s results with those from the low payoff sequential treatment. Table
15 shows that risk measures are 0.12 points higher over gains, and 0.10 points higher
over gain-loss. These differences are significant (t-test for difference in means: over
gains p-value = 0.000, over gain-loss p-value = 0.076).

Table 15. Mean Risk Aversion Measures by Lottery Treatment

Risk aversion over gain
Risk aversion over gain-loss
N

Sequential-Choice
Low Payoff*
0.44
(0.25)
0.43
(0.28)
82

Sequential-Choice
High Payoff
0.43
(0.32)
0.72
(0.32)
99

Simultaneous
Five-Pair
0.56
(0.37)
0.53
(0.37)
442

* Real and hypothetical payoff treatments are combined.
Standard deviations in parentheses

19

For the simultaneous five-pair lottery, subjects are shown five lotteries with a 50-50 chance of either
payoff and asked to choose one. The five lotteries over gains are, (500,500), (800,400), (1100,300), (1400,
200), (1700,100). The lotteries over gain-loss are, (0,0), (300,-100), (600,-200), (900,-300), (1200,-400).
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In the sequential-choice high payoff treatment, people are much more risk averse
over losses (0.72) than any other treatments. Holt and Laury (2002) also saw an increase
in risk aversion over high stakes.

Error Choice Model
While we can count the number of safe choices to derive a risk measure in the
sequential choice lottery, this assumes that those who chose a predicted consistent pattern
did not make a mistake. In a sense, choices we identified as inconsistent are only the
most egregious mistakes; in addition to these errors, it is possible for a subject to
mistakenly choose a consistent lottery choice pattern that is not best for him. To address
this, and because we have few observations per individual, we use the error choice model
proposed by Harless and Camerer (1994) to estimate the probability each individual made
one or more mistake (given his lottery choice pattern) and the distribution of preferences
over predicted patterns.
The intuition behind this approach is that we assume that every individual has a
latent preferred pattern that reflects well-behaved preferences, and that some people make
mistakes in one or more lottery decisions. We assume in each lottery decision, a subject
chooses his preferred option with probability (1-ε)—that is, he errs with probability ε. If
a subject actually prefers pattern AAAAA, for example, the probability he chooses that
pattern is the joint probability that he will make no mistakes over the five choices: (1-ε)5.
If he makes exactly one mistake, he will instead choose BAAAA, ABAAA, AABAA,
AAABA, or AAAAB, and the probability that he makes any of these choices is ε×(1-ε)4.
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We assume that preferences are distributed through the population with proportions
P(AAAAA), P(AAAAB), P(AAABB), P(AABBB), P(ABBBB), and P(BBBBB).
Say that a subject chooses a pattern BAAAA. That could reflect true preferences
of AAAAA with one error, true preferences of AAAAB with two errors, true preferences
of AAABB with three errors, true preferences of AABBB with four errors, true
preferences of ABBBB with five errors, or true preferences of BBBBB with four errors.
The likelihood of observing pattern BAAAA is the sum of the likelihoods of each of
these possibilities: P(AAAAA)×ε×(1-ε)4+P(AAAAB)×ε2×(1-ε)3+ P(AAABB)×ε3×(1-ε)2+
P(AABBB)×ε4×(1-ε)+ P(ABBBB)×ε5+ P(BBBBB)×ε4×(1-ε).
Given individual likelihoods calculated as in this example, we maximize, with
regard to ε and the population preference proportions (e.g., P(AAAAA)), the joint
likelihood of observing the patterns in our data. The estimated ε and proportions allow us
to estimate the probability that any pattern reflects at least one mistake. For example, a
subject who chooses AAAAA may be making no mistake (may truly prefer AAAAA) or
may be making one or more mistake. The probability AAAAA was chosen is the
P(AAAAA) ×(1-ε)5+P(AAAAB)×ε×(1-ε)4+ P(AAABB)×ε2×(1-ε)3+ P(AABBB)×ε3×(1ε)2+ P(ABBBB)×ε4×(1-ε)+ P(BBBBB)×ε5. Only the first term reflects the expression of
true preferences; therefore, the likelihood that AAAAA reflects a mistake is reflected in
all of the other terms—or, alternatively, one minus the probability of no mistakes. In this
way, we calculate the likelihood that each choice pattern reflects at least one mistake (the
likelihood that it does not reflect his true preferences). Thus, for each subject we have
the probability he made a mistake over each set of lotteries (gain or gain-loss) based on
his lottery choices and the parameters estimated by maximum likelihood.
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Any subject who makes an egregiously inconsistent choice (i.e. a switch from B
to A) has, using this method, a mistake probability of 1. If we simply used an indicator
for these egregious mistakes, we would undercount mistakes by assigning all allowed
patterns a mistake probability of 0 when some of those probably do not reflect the true
preferences of the subject.
We estimated the distribution of true preferences given the observed choice
patterns for all lotteries pooled together, for low-stakes only, and for high-stakes only.
The results are shown in Table 16. The error rate, ε, is 0.222 and 0.217 for the pooled
gain and gain-loss lotteries, and as expected, the error rate is higher at low stakes. The
error rate estimates compare well to estimates for several experiments examined in
Harless and Camerer (1994), where error rate estimates were 0.209 - 0.339 for Expected
Utility Theory. Our gain-loss lotteries have a much higher proportion of people who
choose all safe lotteries (BBBBB), especially for high payoffs.

Table 16. Estimated Population Preferences for Lottery Choice Patterns
Choice
Pattern
AAAAA
AAAAB
AAABB
AABBB
ABBBB
BBBBB

Gain
0.31
0.31
0.02
0.02
0.22
0.13



0.22
-3.18

Likelihood
function

All
Gain-Loss

Low Payoffs
Gain
Gain-Loss

High Payoffs
Gain
Gain-Loss

0.37
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.04
0.59

0.39
0.36
0.00
0.00
0.11
0.14

0.67
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.07
0.26

0.25
0.30
0.03
0.06
0.22
0.14

0.19
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.06
0.73

0.22
-3.09

0.34
-3.39

0.31
-3.34

0.13
-2.85

0.15
-2.62
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Inconsistent Choice and Financial Decisions
First, we look at who makes mistakes. Then, we examine how risk aversion and
mistakes affect financial decisions.
Table 17 shows summary statistics for the entire sample and for those who
completed the sequential choice lottery. The variables included are the percent of
subjects who are female, the percent married, the subject’s age in years, the number of
years of education the subject has completed, the subject’s household per capita monthly
expenses in Rwandan francs, the number of children under 18 years old living in the
subject’s household, the number of adults 50 years and older in the household, the
percent of subjects in a savings group, the percent in an insurance group, the percent
having take an informal loan in the past year, and the percent having taken a formal loan
in the past five years. We can see that the entire sample and those who completed the
sequential choice lottery are similar on most variables, with the exception that those in
the sequential choice lottery are not as rich and are more likely to have used credit.
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Table 17. Summary Statistics
All Lottery Subjects
Variable
Female
Married
Age (years)
Education (years)a
Per Capita monthly expenditures (1,000
Rwandan francs)b
Number of children (age < 18) in householdc
Number of elderly (age ≥ 50) in householdc
Member of savings group (tontine)
Member of insurance group
Have used formal credit
Have used informal credit
Number of Observations

Mean
0.39
0.64
36.58
8.84
30.62

Std Dev
0.49
0.48
11.23
3.78
61.97

2.99
0.30
0.18
0.20
0.24
0.48

2.15
0.60
0.39
0.40
0.43
0.50

623

Sequential-Choice
Subjects
Mean
Std Dev
0.37
0.48
0.65
0.48
38.52
10.94
8.41
3.95
21.15
43.68
3.02
0.35
0.22
0.20
0.36
0.55

1.95
0.64
0.41
0.40
0.48
0.50

181

a

There are 14 missing observations on education, so this is based on n=609 for the whole population,
n=178 for the sequential-choice subjects.
b

Household per-capita monthly expenses in Rwandan Francs divided by 1000, range was 0 to 1007.

c

Ages were missing for some household members for some households, so these numbers are based on
n=619 for the whole population, n=180 for the sequential-choice subjects.

Who tends to make mistakes? We regress the estimated probability of having
made at least one mistake (from the error rate model) in the gain and gain-loss lotteries
on demographic variables, as shown in Table 18.20 Because we found no difference in
choices between real and hypothetical treatments for low stakes, those treatments are
pooled together. (If a dummy variable for the real payment treatment is included, it is not
significant, and the results do not change.) As expected, subjects in the low-stakes
treatment showed a greater tendency to make mistakes. The only other significant result
is that over gain-loss women are more likely than men to make mistakes.

20

A Tobit regression yielded the same results. OLS results are reported for ease of interpretation. Results
are also generally similar if the dependent variable is an indicator of ―switching back‖ rather than the
probability a mistake was made.
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Table 18. Probability of At Least One Inconsistent Choice (OLS Regression)
Gain
Gain-Loss
Female
0.049
0.164**
(0.063)
(0.071)
Married
-0.027
0.063
(0.062)
(0.078)
Age
-0.000
-0.006
(0.003)
(0.004)
Education (years)a
0.009
0.002
(0.007)
(0.008)
Monthly expenses
-0.001
-0.001
(0.001)
(0.001)
Number of children (age <18)
0.001
0.010
in household
(0.015)
(0.018)
Number of elderly (age ≥ 50)
-0.049
0.021
in household
(0.044)
(0.057)
Low stakes treatment
0.397***
0.305***
(0.054)
(0.073)
Constant
0.442***
0.636***
(0.140)
(0.182)
R2
0.261
0.184
N
177
177
Standard errors reported in parentheses. *p-value<0.10, **p-value<0.05, ***p-value<0.01. Robust standard
errors are used. All regressions include village-level fixed effects.
a

There were missing values on education for three observations, and missing household ages for another,
so those observations are dropped.

Next, we look at how risk aversion and tendency to make a mistake relate to
financial decisions. Before considering mistakes, we want to see if our proxy risk
aversion measure alone can explain decisions. Table 19 shows how membership in a
savings group or insurance group and having taken either a formal or informal credit is
affected by risk aversion, controlling for demographic covariates.21 For completeness,
we look at both the sequential choice lottery and the five-pair lottery (which does not
allow inconsistent choice). To make these two sets of regressions comparable, we restrict
the sample to the two survey locations where both types of lotteries were administered.
(Assignment of lottery type to a subject within these sites was random.)
21

Results are robust to alternative specifications, such as Logit and Dprobit.
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Table 19. Financial Decisions without Inconsistency Measure (OLS Regressions)
Savings Group
Risk Aversion -0.025
(gain)
(0.114)

Five-Pair Lotteries
Insurance Group
Formal Credit
-0.111
-0.067
(0.132)
(0.144)

Risk Aversion
(gain-loss)
R2
N

0.111
-0.071
0.193
(0.101)
(0.123)
(0.141)
0.033
0.046
0.058
0.053
0.303
0.319
82
82
82
82
82
82
Sequential-Choice Lotteries
Savings Group
Insurance Group
Formal Credit
Risk Aversion 0.281
0.189
-0.347
(gain)
(0.191)
(0.182)
(0.216)
Risk Aversion
(gain-loss)
R2
N

0.111
(0.154)
0.180
89

0.157
89

-0.056
(0.163)
0.191
89

0.179
89

Informal Credit
-0.286*
(0.164)

0.088
82

Informal Credit
0.051
(0.189)

0.260
(0.167)
0.193
89

0.182
89

-0.118
(0.177)
0.058
82

-0.211
(0.184)
0.093
89

0.106
89

Standard errors reported in parentheses. *p-value<0.10, **p-value<0.05, ***p-value<0.01. Robust standard
errors are used. All regressions include the control variables: gender, married, age, education, monthly percapita expenses, number of children (<18 yrs), adults age 50 and older, and village-level fixed effects.
There were missing values on education or on the ages of household members for 5 observations (3 from
the Sequential-Choice Lotteries and 2 from the Five-Pair Lotteries), so those observations are dropped.

As the table shows, risk aversion is not significantly related to most financial
instrument variables. The only weakly significant relationship is between risk aversion
over gains in the five-pair lotteries and taking out an informal loan. Those who are more
risk averse over gains are less likely to use an informal loan. Gender also does not seem
to have any explanatory power.
Since risk aversion alone does not strongly correlate with using financial
instrument use, we ask whether the tendency to make mistakes does. A person who
makes inconsistent choices over risk may fail to take optimal advantage of the financial
instruments available to him, or he may be less trusted by informal lenders and savings
and insurance groups. On the other hand, if he is self-aware of his mistakes, he may
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insure against this tendency and be more likely to select into these instruments. This is
the argument made by Ashraf, Karlan and Yin (2006).
Table 20 shows our results of OLS regressions with bootstrapped standard
errors.22, 23 Being a member of a savings group or taking out an informal loan is
significantly correlated with both risk aversion over gain-loss lotteries and tendency to
make mistakes, but in opposite directions. As described earlier, savings groups serve as a
risk pooling device, so we would expect risk-averse individuals to be more likely to be a
member. They are. Also, borrowing money from informal sources (usually family and
friends) involves the risk of losing face should one fail to repay the loan. These loans do
not carry monetary interest, but they carry an expectation of reciprocation and default in
this context can be socially costly. Therefore, we would expect risk-averse individuals to
be less likely to take out an informal loan. They are.

22

Because we use the estimated probability of making at least one mistake as an independent variable, we
have a generated regressor. We therefore do not use OLS standard errors. Instead, the estimates were done
by sampling with replacement 10,000 times to generate estimates and bootstrapped standard errors. The
estimates are significant if they fall within the confidence interval specified in the table.
23
Results are somewhat similar if an indicator of egregious mistakes (B-to-A switches) is used instead of
the estimated mistake probability, but the results for informal loans, though reflecting the same sign, are no
longer significant. This is not surprising, since the egregious mistake indicator understates true errors.
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Table 20. Financial Decisions with Inconsistency Measures (OLS Regressions with
Bootstrapped Errors)
Gain
Risk Aversion

Savings Group

Insurance Group

Formal Credit

Informal Credit

0.664*
(0.421)

-0.340
(0.411)

-0.583
(0.437)

0.150
(0.478)

Est Prob of
Mistake

0.465
(0.283)

-0.305
(0.273)

-0.108
(0.312)

0.127
(0.336)

Risk aversion *
Est Prob of
Mistake
Gain-Loss
Risk Aversion

-0.820
(0.580)

1.014
(0.599)

0.443
(0.631)

-0.215
(0.749)

Savings Group

Insurance Group

Formal Credit

Informal Credit

0.547***
(0.252)

0.096
(0.247)

0.290
(0.271)

-0.611***
(0.218)

Est Prob of
Mistake

0.515***
(0.239)

0.199
(0.237)

0.081
(0.270)

-0.606***
(0.219)

Risk aversion *
Est Prob of
Mistake
N

-1.185***
(0.393)

-0.366
(0.361)

0.020
(0.443)

0.786***
(0.427)

89

89

89

89

89

89

89

89

Standard errors reported in parentheses. The estimates are bootstrapped 10,000 times. *coefficient falls
between the [0.05, 0.95] percentiles of the bootstrapped parameter distribution, ** coefficient falls between
the [0.025, 0.975] percentiles of the bootstrapped parameter distribution, *** coefficient falls between the
[0.01, 0.99] percentiles of the bootstrapped parameter distribution. All regressions include the following
control variables: gender, married, age, education, monthly per-capita expenses, number of children (<18
yrs), adults age 50 and older, and village-level fixed effects. There were missing values on education or
household member ages for 3 observations, so those observations are dropped.

More importantly, risk aversion and tendency to make mistakes interact in
meaningful and significant ways. If we control only for tendency to make mistakes or
risk and mistakes (not interacted), there is no significant effect. That is, mistakes alone,
risk alone, and risk and mistakes do not correlate with financial decisions. It is the
interaction of the two that is important. Conditional on being more likely to make
mistakes, a risk-averse individual is less likely to be in a savings group and more likely to
take out an informal loan. That is, those who make mistakes are less likely to choose as
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we would expect. These results suggest that individuals who make mistakes are not self
aware, but rather do not choose optimally or are excluded from groups or informal loans.
It is possible that the causation between our risk and mistake measures and the use
of financial instruments runs in the opposite direction. People who are in savings groups
may know that they have a safety net and therefore feel comfortable acting in a riskier
fashion; similarly, people who know they have outstanding obligations in their social
network due to informal credit usage may feel less comfortable acting in a risky fashion.
These correlations are opposite from what our results show. However, it is conceivable
that people who are in a savings group are less careful in the lab because they have a
safety net (they make more errors) or that people who use informal credit are more
careful because of their outstanding obligations (they make fewer errors). This is not
precisely an endogeneity problem, but simply a different possible explanation for the
result we observe.
Not all financial decisions are significantly correlated with risk aversion or
mistakes. Being a member of an insurance group and taking out a formal loan are not
correlated with risk aversion, tendency to make mistakes, or the interaction. This may be
because insurance groups offer a variety of services, such as insurance, labor, and credit,
so the correlation with risk and mistakes is obscured. Formal loans from banks may be
given under a specific set of criteria that are unrelated (or only weakly related) to risk
aversion and the tendency to make mistakes.
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Conclusions
Can we learn anything from mistakes? This research suggests that we can. Using
a lottery experiment designed to detect inconsistent choice in risk, we examine the
correlation between risk aversion, mistakes, and financial activities that may serve as
safety nets. We find that the tendency to make inconsistent choices over risk is
widespread and women are more susceptible than men. When mistakes are ignored, risk
aversion alone does not explain the use of financial instruments. When we control for the
tendency to make inconsistent choices, however, risk and mistakes explain participation
in savings groups and the use of informal credit. As we would expect, risk-averse
individuals are more likely to belong to a savings group and less likely to take out an
informal loan. Those who are more likely to make mistakes display the opposite
behavior. Mistakes in the experiment are correlated with apparently suboptimal behavior
in these financial decisions.
The policy advice implied by these results are ambiguous, because it’s not clear
whether financial choices are correlated with lab decisions because the financial choices
are mistakes, because people are hedging against their own tendency to err, or because
mistake-prone people are well-known in their communities and are therefore not offered
credit. Financial literacy education that encourages proper usage of financial instruments
may be fruitful in any of these cases. An interesting follow-up to this study would be to
experimentally provide financial literacy education and see whether changes are observed
later in either lottery choices or financial instrument take-up.
This paper makes two contributions to the literature. First, our results may help
explain the inconclusive results that relate lottery-measured risk aversion to economic
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outcomes. Like other researchers, we do not find a significant correlation between risk
aversion and outcomes. While some have suggested that the lack of correlation may be
caused by a failure to properly control for background risk (Harrison, List, and Towe
2007), our results suggest that it may also be due to not controlling for mistakes. Second,
our results show that tests for consistent behavior in lab experiments may yield results
that help explain choices in non-experimental settings. Previous work has mostly ignored
inconsistent choices or designed experiments to not permit inconsistent behavior. This
research suggests that important behavioral information may be embedded in mistakes.
Interactions of mistakes and preferences clearly have power to predict behavior.
Therefore, lab experiments that intentionally reveal mistakes may be important tools for
understanding important economic behaviors in credit markets, and may be useful in a
variety of other settings as well.
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Appendix A: Instructions for the Girl Scout Cookie Experiment

This Appendix contains the instructions provided to subjects in the Girl Scout
Cookie experiment. There are four components to the instructions: the General
Instructions, which are read at the start of the experiment; and then the specific
instructions for each of three treatments. Each treatment’s instructions starts with the
text, ―Instructions for the [next] set of rounds.‖ In this Appendix, the name of the
treatment is noted on the same line of text, although the treatment name was not included
in the instructions the subjects saw. Otherwise, except for details of pagination, these
instructions are identical to those provided to the students.

General Instructions
Welcome to the experiment! This is a study of decision-making behavior. It will
last about two hours.
Complete Privacy
This experiment is structured so that no one, including the experimenters and the
other participants, will ever know the decisions or earnings of anyone in the experiment.
You will collect your earnings, in a sealed envelope, from a numbered mailbox that only
you will have the key for. Your privacy is guaranteed because neither your name nor your
student ID number will appear on any form that records your decisions or your earnings.
The only identifying mark that will be used is the identification number on the mailbox
key that you will select. Each key opens a mailbox in the hallway adjacent to this room.
After the experiment, you will each collect your payment from your mailbox alone and
privately. The key and mailbox are labeled with the same identification number. You are
the only person who will know your identification number.
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Random Group Assignments and Anonymity
Each person will be randomly matched with 4 other people to form a 5-person
group. No one will learn the identity of the people in his/her group. The composition of
your group will change after a number of rounds, and you will be randomly matched in a
new group of 5 people (you and 4 others). You will be notified when the groups have
been rearranged. Once you are matched with a group, you will learn how many rounds
you will play with this group. In total, you will play in 3 different 5-person groups.
Your Payment
In each round of the experiment, you will make a decision. What you earn in
each round will depend on decisions that you and the other 4 people in your group make.
Your payment for this experiment will be the sum of your earnings in all rounds.
The Task
For each decision, you will choose how to divide 20 tokens between two
funds: the Personal Fund and the Group Fund. You are free to contribute some of
your tokens to the Personal Fund and some to the Group Fund. Alternatively, you can
contribute all of them to the Personal Fund, or all of them to the Group Fund. You will
earn money from the tokens you put in each fund (below we describe how). Your total
earnings for each round is the sum of your earnings from the Personal Fund plus your
earnings from the Group Fund.
1. The Personal Fund: each token you contribute to the Personal Fund will earn you
$0.02.
Example: Suppose you contribute 0 tokens to the Personal Fund. Then you would earn
nothing from the Personal Fund.
Example: Suppose you contribute 10 tokens to the Personal Fund. Then you would earn
$0.20 from the Personal Fund.
Example: Suppose you contribute 20 tokens to the Personal Fund. Then you would earn
$0.40 from the Personal Fund.

96

2. The Group Fund: What you earn from the Group Fund will depend on the total
number of tokens that you and the other 4 members of your group contribute to
the Group Fund. Every token any member of your group puts in the Group Fund
earns money for each member of the group, but not everyone will earn the same
amount of money.
Before we explain more about the earnings from the Group Fund, you must learn
about the Stakeholder. In each round, one member of your group will be the
Stakeholder. This person earns more money (relative to the rest of the group) from all
of the tokens in the Group Fund. You will always know whether you are the Stakeholder.
If you are not the Stakeholder, you earn $0.01 for each token any member of your
group puts in the Group Fund. If you are the Stakeholder, you earn $0.03 for every
token any member of your group puts in the Group Fund.
Example: Suppose you contribute 0 tokens to the Group Fund and no one else contributes
any tokens to the Group Fund. Then you would earn nothing from the Group Fund.
Everyone else in your group would also earn nothing from the Group Fund.
Example: Suppose you contribute 13 tokens to the Group Fund and no one else
contributes any tokens to the Group Fund. Suppose that you are the Stakeholder. Then
you would earn $0.39 from the Group Fund. Everyone else in your group would earn
$0.13 each from the Group Fund.
Example: Suppose you contribute 20 tokens to the Group Fund and no one else
contributes any tokens to the Group Fund. Suppose that you are not the Stakeholder.
Then you would earn $0.20 from the Group Fund. The Stakeholder would earn $0.60
from the Group Fund. All of the other members of your group would earn $0.20 each
from the Group Fund.
Everyone will earn money from every token contributed to the Group Fund,
whether they contribute tokens to the Group Fund or not.
Decision Panel
For each decision, you will enter your Group Fund contribution in the Decision
Panel. The Decision Panel is a box at the bottom of the screen that looks like the
following:
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Type the amount you want to put in the Group Fund in the box. This must be a
number between 0 and 20. The amount that will go into your Personal Fund is 20 minus
the amount you type. For example, if you type the number 0, 0 tokens will go into the
Group Fund and 20 into the Personal Fund. If you type 6, 6 tokens will go into the Group
Fund and 14 into the Personal Fund. If you type 13, 13 tokens will go into the Group
Fund and 7 into the Personal Fund.
When you are satisfied with the allocation of tokens you entered, you will click
the ―SUBMIT‖ button to submit your allocation.
Contributions Table
The Contributions Table gives you information about what has happened in past
rounds and what will happen in future rounds. The table will show all of the rounds you
will play with your current group, and will indicate when you will be the Stakeholder.
Also, after everyone has made their decisions for a round, the table will tell you what the
Group Fund contributions were in that round, and what your earnings were.
The table will change slightly in different parts of the experiment. Before each
part starts, you will receive specific instructions and you will see what the table will look
like.
Each Round Has Two Steps
In each Round, you will proceed through two screens, one after the other. The
first screen is the decision screen. In the decision screen, you will make your decision
and click the ―SUBMIT‖ button when you are done. After everyone has clicked
―SUBMIT‖, everyone will proceed to the review screen.
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The review screen will look very much like the decision screen, but you will have
no decision to make. You will see information about the decisions that were made in that
round and previous rounds, and you will learn how much money you earned in that
round. In the Decision Panel of the review screen, you will see exactly how your
earnings for that round were calculated. When you are done reviewing this information,
you must click ―DONE‖ to continue.

The information in the Contributions Table will stay in the table through all
rounds you play with the group, in both the decision and review screens
Questionnaire and Payment
After you have finished all of your decisions, you will complete a brief
questionnaire. Then you will receive payment anonymously and privately, and the
session will be over. You will collect your payment with no one watching, and no one
else will learn your earnings.
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QUIZ
Case 1: Suppose out of your 20 tokens you contributed 5 tokens to the Personal Fund
and 15 tokens to the Group Fund. Suppose that the other 4 members of your group
together contribute a total of 60 tokens to the Group Fund. Returns for the two Funds
are:
Personal Fund:

$0.02 per token to you

Group Fund:

$0.03 per token to Stakeholder
$0.01 per token to non-Stakeholders

a) How much do you earn from the Personal Fund? _________
b) How many tokens in total were contributed by your group to the Group Fund?
_________
c) If you ARE the Stakeholder, how much do you earn from the Group Fund?
_________
d) If you ARE the Stakeholder, how much do each of the other members of your
group earn from the Group Fund? _________
e) If you ARE the Stakeholder, how much do you earn altogether? _________
f) If you ARE NOT the Stakeholder, how much do you earn from the Group Fund?
_________
g) If you ARE NOT the Stakeholder, how much does the group’s Stakeholder earn
from the Group Fund? _________
h) If you ARE NOT the Stakeholder, how much do each of the group’s other nonStakeholders earn from the Group Fund? _________
i) If you ARE NOT the Stakeholder, how much do you earn altogether? _________
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Case 2: Suppose out of your 20 tokens you contributed 20 tokens to the Personal Fund
and 0 tokens to the Group Fund. Suppose that the other 4 members of your group
together contribute a total of 8 tokens to the Group Fund. Returns for the two Funds are:
Personal Fund:

$0.02 per token to you

Group Fund:

$0.03 per token to Stakeholder
$0.01 per token to non-Stakeholders



How much do you earn from the Personal Fund? _________



How many tokens in total were contributed by your group to the Group Fund?
_________



If you ARE the Stakeholder, how much do you earn from the Group Fund?
_________



If you ARE the Stakeholder, how much do each of the other members of your
group earn from the Group Fund? _________



If you ARE the Stakeholder, how much do you earn altogether? _________



If you ARE NOT the Stakeholder, how much do you earn from the Group Fund?
_________



If you ARE NOT the Stakeholder, how much does the group’s Stakeholder earn
from the Group Fund? _________



If you ARE NOT the Stakeholder, how much do each of the group’s other nonStakeholders earn from the Group Fund? _________



If you ARE NOT the Stakeholder, how much do you earn altogether? _________
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Instructions for the First Set of Rounds (PUBLIC TREATMENT)


You will now be randomly assigned by the computer into groups of 5 people.



You will be with the same group for 10 rounds.



Each member of your group will be randomly assigned a new, different letter code
that you will keep for these 10 rounds: A, B, C, D, or E.



The Stakeholder position will rotate through all 5 members of the group, in
alphabetical order (A, then B, then C, etc.). Each member of the group will be
Stakeholder twice.



You will always know who is currently Stakeholder, when you are going to be
Stakeholder, and when each other member of your group (identified by their letter
code) will be Stakeholder, because the Stakeholder position will be marked in the
Contributions Table and in the status bar.



In each round, you must decide how many of 20 tokens to put in the Personal
Fund and how many in the Group Fund.



When you have made your decision (by typing how many tokens (0 to 20) you
want to put in the Group Fund), you must click ―SUBMIT‖.



The Contributions Table will show, for each past round:


what each member (identified by letter code) has contributed to the Group
Fund; that is, there will be a column in the table corresponding to each
group member, and that member’s contributions for each round will be
filled in after the round





the total number of tokens in the Group Fund



your earnings

You will be able to tell what each group member contributed in each round; they
will also be able to tell what you contributed in each round.



The table will indicate in which rounds each person will be the Stakeholder by
marking those rounds in each person’s column with red, underlined stars (*****).
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You will see which column corresponds to you because your column will say the
word YOU above it. Each person has YOU marked at the top of their own
column.



Also at the top of each table, in each round, the word Stakeholder will appear in
red above the column of the person who is the Stakeholder in this round.



After everyone has made their decisions for each round, you may examine the
Contributions Table and the calculation of your earnings in the review screen.
Click ―DONE‖ when you are ready to move on to the next round.
When you are entering your contribution, the screen will look like this:
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When you are reviewing your results, the screen will look like this:
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Instructions for the Second Set of Rounds (PRIVATE TREATMENT)


You will now be randomly assigned by the computer into groups of 5 people.



You will be with the same group for 10 rounds.



All 5 members of the group will be Stakeholder twice.



You will only know when YOU are the Stakeholder—you will not know which
group member is the Stakeholder in any given round if it is not you.



In each round, you must decide how many of 20 tokens to put in the Personal
Fund and how many in the Group Fund.



When you have made your decision (by typing how many tokens (0 to 20) you
want to put in the Group Fund), you must click ―SUBMIT‖.



The Contributions Table will show, for each past round:


what you have contributed to the Group Fund



a list of the Group Fund contributions of the other members of your group;
these contributions will be listed in a random order that is reshuffled for
each round





the total number of tokens in the Group Fund



your earnings

No one will not be able to track any other individual group member’s
contributions.



The table will indicate in which rounds you will be the Stakeholder by marking
those rounds in your column with red, underlined stars (*****).



After everyone has made their decisions for each round, you may examine the
Contributions Table and the calculation of your earnings in the review screen.
Click ―DONE‖ when you are ready to move on to the next round.
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When you are entering your contribution, the screen will look like this:
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When you are reviewing your results, the screen will look like this:

107

Instructions for the Third Set of Rounds (INELIGIBLE TREATMENT)


You will now be randomly assigned by the computer into groups of 5 people.



You will be with the same group for 8 rounds.



Each member of your group will be randomly assigned a new, different letter code
that you will keep for these 8 rounds: A, B, C, D, or E.



The Stakeholder position will rotate through 4 of the 5 members of the group.



The one person in your group who will never be the Stakeholder is the Ineligible
Person. This person is randomly selected at the start of this set of rounds, and
will be Ineligible (will never be the Stakeholder) for all 8 rounds. The Ineligible
Person is identified to all group members in the Contributions Table and in the
text in the status bar.



The Stakeholder position rotates through the four eligible members of the group
for all 8 rounds, in alphabetical order. For example, if person C is randomly
chosen as Ineligible, the first Stakeholder will be person A, the second will be B,
the third will be D, etc.



Everyone who is not Ineligible will be Stakeholder twice.



You will always know who is currently Stakeholder, when you are going to be
Stakeholder, and when each other member of your group (identified by their letter
code) will be Stakeholder, because the Stakeholder position will be marked in the
Contributions Table and in the status bar.



In each round, you must decide how many of 20 tokens to put in the Personal
Fund and how many in the Group Fund.



When you have made your decision (by typing how many tokens (0 to 20) you
want to put in the Group Fund), you must click ―SUBMIT‖.



The Contributions Table will show, for each past round:


what each member (identified by letter code) has contributed to the Group
Fund; that is, there will be a column in the table corresponding to each
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group member, and that member’s contributions for each round will be
filled in after the round





the total number of tokens in the Group Fund



your earnings

You will be able to tell what each group member contributed in each round; they
will also be able to tell what you contributed in each round.



The table will indicate in which rounds each person will be the Stakeholder by
marking those rounds in each person’s column with red, underlined stars (*****).



You will see which column corresponds to you because your column will say the
word YOU above it. Each person has YOU marked at the top of their own
column.



Also at the top of each table, in each round, the word Stakeholder will appear
above the column of the person who is the Stakeholder in this round.



The word Ineligible will appear above the column of the Ineligible person.



After everyone has made their decisions for each round, you may examine the
Contributions Table and the calculation of your earnings in the review screen.
Click ―DONE‖ when you are ready to move on to the next round.
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When you are entering your contribution, the screen will look like this:
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When you are reviewing your results, the screen will look like this:
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Appendix B: Parametric Tests of Reciprocity in the Girl Scout Cookie Experiment

In this Appendix, we use regression techniques to identify reciprocal behavior
resulting from direct reciprocity and strategic self-interest. These results may be biased
because of the endogeneity inherent in group dynamic behavior. We take care to limit
the influence of this bias, but it is, to some extent, unavoidable.
We perform a panel regression for one treatment at a time, with fixed effects and
errors clustered by group. Non-Stakeholder contributions in each round git are regressed
on characteristics of that round, including hikt (a summary of the current Stakeholder k’s
past generosity toward subject i: here, the current Stakeholder’s cumulative average
contributions when subject i was Stakeholder) and Xit (other variables):

git  a  bhikt  CXit   it
If direct reciprocity or strategic self-interest is important, b (the coefficient on hikt)
should be positive in both the Public and Ineligible treatments. In the Private treatment, b
should be zero, because in each round, no-one knows who the current Stakeholder is or
what that person has done in the past. Group-level conditional cooperation could bias
this coefficient upward, so we counteract that bias by including a control for group
generosity in Xit. Our control for group generosity is the group’s cumulative average
non-Stakeholder contribution in past rounds. For each subject in each round, this
measure excludes his own past contributions and those of the current Stakeholder. In the
Ineligible treatment, this group measure also excludes the Bachelor (although the same
results obtain using a measure that includes the Bachelor, results available on request).
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The panel regression also includes in Xit the current round number and an
indicator for whether this subject has passed his last Stakeholder stint. If the coefficient
on the round number is negative, there is a secular drop-off in cooperation. The
coefficient on the post-last-Stakeholder stint dummy can be interpreted as the importance
of strategic giving. If a subject gives strategically in the rounds before his last
Stakeholder stint, there should be a discontinuity in contributions that should be reflected
in a large, negative coefficient on this dummy.
Results are shown in Table 21. Directly reciprocal behavior is supported for the
Public and Ineligible treatments. The coefficient on the post-last-Stakeholder stint
dummy in the Public and Ineligible treatments is insignificant. This implies that strategic
motives are not important. The same results obtain in an AR1 specification (results
available upon request), except that in the Private treatment the post-last-Stakeholder stint
dummy is no longer significant.
Table 21. Fixed Effects Panel Regression of Non-Stakeholder Contribution (in Percent
of Endowment) on Period-Level Covariates
Private Treatment Public Treatment Ineligible Treatment
Stakeholder average
0.05
0.24***
0.23**
past contributions to me
(0.06)
(0.05)
(0.09)
Group average
0.25
0.05
-0.08
contributions
(0.16)
(0.17)
(0.27)
Round number
0.03
-1.69
-2.86**
(0.65)
(1.22)
(1.34)
Post-last Stakeholder
-9.66**
-1.66
-4.85
Stint? (dummy)
(3.86)
(5.05)
(5.40)
Constant
22.15***
34.65**
42.50**
(7.48)
(13.68)
(16.18)
Observations (rounds)
720
720
432
Number of subjects
120
120
96
F
4.50
13.37
31.47
R2 (overall)
0.078
0.182
0.156
Robust standard errors in parentheses; errors are clustered on groups; individual fixed effects
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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As in Chapter I, we can test for the importance of other-regarding preferences by
restricting our attention to the rounds after a subject has passed his final Stakeholder stint.
See results in Table 22. Due to the reduced population size, particularly for the Ineligible
treatment, test power is significantly reduced and the Stakeholder past contribution
coefficient is not statistically significant for the Ineligible treatment. However, the
coefficient on Stakeholder past contribution is positive for the Public treatment. This
implies that reciprocal behavior is at least partly rooted in other-regarding preferences.

Table 22. Fixed Effects Panel Regression of Non-Stakeholder Contribution (in Percent of
Endowment) on Period-Level Covariates, Post-Last Stakeholder Stint
Private Treatment Public Treatment Ineligible Treatment
Stakeholder average
-0.19
0.21*
0.17
past contributions to me
(0.11)
(0.11)
(0.22)
Group average
0.39
-0.09
0.30
contributions
(0.44)
(0.32)
(0.60)
Round number
-4.12**
-5.90***
-4.89
(1.83)
(1.96)
(2.26)
Constant
48.39**
76.14***
42.89
(22.93)
(25.80)
(25.08)
Observations (rounds)
240
240
144
Number of subjects
96
96
72
F
2.03
3.70
1.78
R2 (overall)
0.036
0.106
0.083
Robust standard errors in parentheses; errors are clustered on groups; individual fixed effects
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Finally, we build error clustering by group and fixed effects into a test using
aggregate statistics, since this should eliminate the bias of our panel analysis while
checking for robustness to intra-class correlation. We create two stacked observations
per subject: one to represent the subject’s behavior in rounds in which the current
Stakeholder was previously generous (using the 10 token, or 50%-of-endowment,
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threshold) toward this subject, and one to represent his behavior in rounds when the
Stakeholder was ungenerous toward this subject. A ―nice dummy‖ differentiates between
the two observations for each subject. We perform a panel regression, with these two
observations per subject, in which we regress contributions on the ―nice dummy.‖ The
same results obtain if we use group dummies, individual random effects, and individual
fixed effects. In Table 23 we show results of the individual fixed effects regression
without group dummies. The ―nice‖ dummy is significant and positive for the Public and
Ineligible treatments, but not for the Private treatment. The result that reciprocal
behavior continues after the last Stakeholder stint also persists in this specification
(results available upon request).

Table 23. Panel Stacked Regression of Average Contribution (in Percent of Endowment)
on "Nice Dummy"
Private Treatment Public Treatment Ineligible Treatment
―Nice dummy‖
-1.59
14.83***
17.30***
(2.72)
(2.68)
(2.72)
Constant
29.16***
27.09***
23.92***
(1.36)
(1.34)
(1.36)
Subjects
82
95
75
2
R (overall)
-0.001
0.058
0.096
F
0.34
30.54
40.37
Robust standard errors in parentheses; errors clustered on groups; individual fixed effects
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Appendix C: Predictions of Risk Preference Theories

In this Appendix, we describe in detail why the choices we call mistakes or
inconsistent choices over risk are, in fact, inconsistent with standard theories of
preferences over risk.
First, we note that the gain lotteries can be defined as follows. Lottery pair i
(where i = 1, …, 5) offers two options:
Safe lottery = Lottery B = { x + (i – 1)b, p=1/2; x – (i – 1)a }
Risky lottery = Lottery A = { x + ib, p=1/2; x – ia }
Similarly, for the gain-loss lotteries, lottery pair i offers:
Safe lottery = Lottery B = { x + (i – 1)b, p=1/2; 0 – (i – 1)a }
Risky lottery = Lottery A = { x + ib, p=1/2; 0 – ia }
For low stakes lotteries, x = 500 RWF, a = 100 RWF, b = 200 RWF, and for high
stakes lotteries, x = 1250 RWF, a = 250 RWF, b = 400 RWF. We will demonstrate the
argument for gain lotteries; the same conditions hold for the gain-loss lotteries except as
noted.

Expected Value
Proposition 1. An Expected Value maximizer will prefer Lottery Ai for all i > 0.
Proof. For every lottery pair i, Lottery A has a lower expected value than Lottery B:
EV  Ai  

1
 x  ib    x  ia 
2

This simplifies to:
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EV  Ai   x
EV  Bi  

i
b  a 
2

1
 x   i  1 b    x   i  1 a 

2

This simplifies to:
EV  Bi   x

i 1
b  a 
2

Therefore, choices governed by Expected Value will be A for all i > 0. Therefore,
Expected Value only predicts the pattern AAAAA.

Expected Utility
Proposition 2. Assume that Expected Utility governs choices, and that the utility
function is increasing and non-inflected in the range of the lotteries. Then if Lottery B is
chosen for some lottery pair i, Lottery A may not be chosen for any following lottery i+1.
Proof. Define a utility function u(x). Then Expected Utility from a lottery is

EU   pi u  xi  , so for the lotteries in this experiment where each outcome has
i

probability ½:

EU 

1
u  x1   u  x2   u  x1   u  x2 
2

Therefore, the expected utilities from the two lotteries can be defined as:

EU  Ai   u  x  ib   u  x  ia 
EU  Bi   u  x   i  1 b   u  x   i  1 a 
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If the function u(x) is convex or linear, then for all i, EU(Ai) > EU(Bi) (note that A
always has a higher expected value). In these cases, Lottery B will never be chosen, and
therefore it would be impossible to switch from selecting B in pair i to A in pair i+1. Therefore,
it suffices to show only that such a switch is impossible for strictly concave utility functions.

Figure 7 below demonstrates the prizes for lottery i and lottery (i+1) for a concave
utility function over income.

x-(i+1)a x-ia x-(i-1)a x+(i-1)b x+ib x+(i+1)b

Figure 7: Concave Utility Functions over Lottery Prizes

We define:

udiff1  u  x  ia   u  x   i  1 a 
udiff 2  u  x   i  1 a   u  x  ia 
udiff3  u  x  ib   u  x   i  1 b 
udiff 4  u  x   i  1 b   u  x  ib 
A concave utility function gets flatter as wealth decreases, so for a concave utility
function, udiff1 > udiff2 and udiff3 > udiff4.
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In lottery pair i, choosing B means that EU(Bi) ≥ EU(Ai):
u  x   i  1 b   u  x   i  1 a   u  x  ib   u  x  ia 

This simplifies to:
u  x   i  1 a   u  x  ia   u  x  ib   u  x  i  1 b 

In other words, udiff2 ≥ udiff3. In lottery pair i+1, choosing A means:
u  x   i  1 b   u  x   i  1 a   u  x  ib   u  x  ia 

This simplifies to:
u  x  ia   u  x   i  1 a   u  x  i  1 b   u  x  ib 

In other words, udiff1 ≤ udiff4. However, it cannot simultaneously be true that
udiff1 ≤ udiff4 and udiff2 ≥ udiff3 if the utility function is strictly concave throughout the
region. This is because if it is strictly concave, then udiff1 > udiff2 and udiff3 > udiff4 and
therefore udiff2 ≥ udiff3 implies udiff1 > udiff3 and therefore udiff1 > udiff4, which implies
that lottery B must be chosen in pair i+1. This is a contradiction.
Thus for a utility function that is concave through this region, an expected utility
maximizer must never switch from B to A in a subsequent lottery pair. Therefore,
Expected Utility Theory only predicts patterns that do not switch from B to A; namely,
AAAAA, AAAAB, AAABB, AABBB, ABBBB, and BBBBB.

Rank Dependent Theory, Prospect Theory, and Cumulative Prospect Theory
Proposition 3. Assume that Rank Dependent Theory, Prospect Theory, or Cumulative
Prospect Theory governs choices, and that the value function is increasing, concave, and
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non-inflected in the range of the lotteries. Then if Lottery B is chosen for some lottery
pair i, Lottery A may not be chosen for any following lottery i+1.
Proof. Rank Dependent Theory, Prospect Theory, and Cumulative Prospect Theory
transform both payoffs as well as probabilities.
Although Prospect Theory allows an inflection point at zero, and Cumulative
Prospect Theory allows inflection point at somewhat arbitrary reference points, the
assumption of no inflection points in the range of the lotteries excludes the possibility of
a reference points in the range of our lotteries. Note that this means that this Proposition
cannot apply to Prospect Theory for the gain-loss lotteries.
Although the probabilities for the high and low outcomes are both ½, we allow
the transformed probabilities to differ. We designate the transformed probabilities as
constants k1 and k2. For our lotteries, these theories predict choice in lottery pair i based
on a function of the form:

U RD / CPT  Ai   k1v  x  ia   k2v  x  ib 
U RD /CPT  Bi   k1v  x   i  1 a   k2v  x  i  1 b 

Analogous to the terminology in the Expected Utility demonstration, we define:

vdiff1  v  x  ia   v  x   i  1 a 
vdiff 2  v  x   i  1 a   v  x  ia 
vdiff3  v  x  ib   v  x   i  1 b 
vdiff 4  v  x   i  1 b   v  x  ib 
In these theories, if a subject prefers lottery B to A in pair i:
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k1v  x   i  1 a   k2v  x  i  1 b   k1v  x  ia   k2v  x  ib 

This simplifies to:
k1
v  x   i  1 a   v  x  ia   v  x  ib   v  x   i  1 b 

k2 

In other words,

k1
vdiff 2  vdiff 3 . In pair i+1, choosing A means:
k2

k1v  x   i  1 a   k2v  x  i  1 b   k1v  x  ia   k2v  x  ib 

This simplifies to:
k1
v  x  ia   v  x   i  1 a   v  x   i  1 b   v  x  ib 

k2 

In other words,

k1
vdiff1  vdiff 4 .
k2

If v is concave then vdiff1 > vdiff2 and vdiff3 > vdiff4. Therefore, if
k
k
k1
vdiff 2  vdiff 3 , then 1 vdiff1  vdiff3 and therefore 1 vdiff1  vdiff 4 . But that violates
k2
k2
k2

the assumption that lottery Ai+1 is preferred to Bi+1. This is therefore a contradiction, and
therefore given the assumptions imposed a person choosing according to Rank
Dependent Theory, Prospect Theory, or Cumulative Prospect Theory must never choose
lottery B in pair i and subsequently choose lottery A in pair i+1.
Given these assumptions, these theories only predict patterns that do not switch
from B to A: AAAAA, AAAAB, AAABB, AABBB, ABBBB, and BBBBB.
Discussion. Reference points create a particular challenge for Prospect Theory in the
area of 0 (i.e. for the gain-loss lotteries) and for Cumulative Prospect Theory for both sets
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of lotteries. These reference points are inflection points, and given such an inflection
point the prediction is indeterminate.
Discussion. If the value function is convex, it is possible for probability weighting to
explain switching from lottery B in pair i to lottery A in pair i+1. If a value function is
convex, then vdiff1 < vdiff2 < vdiff3 < vdiff4. Recall that both probabilities are ½, but they
are transformed to weights k1 and k2. By logic like the above, if Bi is preferred to Ai, then
k
k1
vdiff 2  vdiff 3 . If Ai+1 is preferred to Bi+1, then 1 vdiff1  vdiff 4 . These conditions
k2
k2

can all be met if

vdiff3 k1 vdiff 4
.
 
vdiff 2 k2 vdiff1

Dual Theory
Proposition 4. Assume that the Dual Theory, which transforms probabilities but not
payoffs, governs choices. Then if the subject strongly prefers A for some pair i, he must
prefer A for all following pairs; similarly, if he strongly prefers B for some pair i, he must
prefer B for all following pairs.
Proof. The dual theory does not transform payoffs but only transforms probabilities. We
again use k1 and k2 to denote the transformed ½ probabilities for the high and low prizes
respectively. Therefore, Dual Theory evaluations of the lotteries in pair i are:

U DT  Ai   k1  x  ia   k2  x  ib 
U DT  Bi   k1  x   i  1 a   k2  x   i  1 b 

This simplifies to:
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U DT  Ai    k1  k2  x  i  k2b  k1a 
U DT  Bi    k1  k2  x  i  1 k2b  k1a 
Therefore, a subject who chooses according to the Dual Theory will choose Ai if:

 k1  k2  x  i  k2b  k1a    k1  k2  x  i  1 k2b  k1a 
This simplifies to:

0  k2b  k1a
Since this choice does not depend on i, it will either be true for all lottery pairs or
for no lottery pairs. That is, a Dual Theory optimizer will always choose AAAAA or
BBBBB if he has strong preferences.
Discussion. If a Dual Theory optimizer is indifferent for one lottery pair in the set, he
will be indifferent for all lottery pairs in the set. True or ―practical‖ indifference could
produce patterns other than those predicted here.
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